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UNIFORMITY AND DIVERSITY IN PAYMENT SYSTEMS
CLAYTON P. GILLETTE* AND STEVEN D. WALT**
INTRODUCTION
Current law adopts different rules for different payment systems. The
allocation of losses from unauthorized payment, erroneous payment, and
the reversibility of instructions to pay varies depending on whether pay-
ment is made by check, credit or debit card, wholesale wire transfer, or
letter of credit.1 On its face, the diversity of payment systems rules seems
counterproductive. It can cause confusion among users of payment sys-
tems, who might assume that rules with which they are familiar from one
system apply similarly to other systems. Diversity thus increases learning
costs among users and leads to unanticipated consequences when unin-
formed users make incorrect assumptions about uniformity. The greater the
degree of uniformity across payment systems, the lower the search costs
incurred by a party in selecting the appropriate device for her transaction.
Diversity also often appears to be a consequence of historical contingency
rather than well-designed analysis. To take a minor example, it is difficult
to reconcile the different statutory definitions for "unauthorized" credit
cards and consumer electronic fund transfers other than by reference to
drafting inconsistencies over time.2 Finally, the costs of diversity appear to
* Max E. Greenberg Professor of Contract Law, New York University School of Law. Thanks
to Oren Bar-Gill and Ronald Mann for insightful comments on earlier drafts.
** Professor of Law and Sullivan & Cromwell Research Professor, University of Virginia School
of Law.
1. Rules applicable to particular payment devices also vary across countries. See BENJAMIN
GEVA, BANK COLLECTIONS AND PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS 210-18 (2001) (wire transfer law); Paulo S.
Grassi, Letter of Credit Transactions: The Bank's Position in Determining Documentary Compliance: A
Comparative Evaluation Under U.S., Swiss and German Law, 7 PACE INT'L L. REV. 81, 118-21 (1995)
(describing different standards of strict compliance under domestic letter of credit law). This article,
however, is concerned solely with domestic payment systems rules. For a cross-country comparison of
the different frequencies of use of paper instruments and electronic payments, see David B. Humphrey,
Lawrence B. Pulley & Jukka M. Vesala, Cash, Paper, and Electronic Payments: A Cross-Country
Analysis, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 914 (1996).
2. Under the Truth-In-Lending Act, an "unauthorized use" of a credit card means use by a person
"other than the cardholder who does not have actual, implied, or apparent authority for such use." 15
U.S.C. § 1602(o) (2000). Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, however, an "'unauthorized elec-
tronic fund transfer' means a transfer from a consumer's account initiated by a person other than the
consumer without actual authority to initiate such transfer." 15 U.S.C. § 1693a( 11). It is unclear why a
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be exacerbated by the current spate of new payment mechanisms, com-
bined with increasing international transactions that entail some form of
payment. Together, these concerns underlie the push for uniformity among
payment systems, both domestically and internationally.
But diversity in payment systems produces some unsung benefits. The
form in which payment is made is part of the transaction that calls for pay-
ment. It therefore is an express or implied term that allocates risks within
that transaction, no different in this respect from the transaction's other
terms. Payment systems themselves entail multiple risks, each of which is
likely to be priced into the transaction-at least in transactions involving
sophisticated parties or thick markets. First, payments rules allocate risks of
fraud and error in the underlying transaction. A buyer of goods, for in-
stance, might prefer paying with a check that is susceptible to a stop-
payment order and that therefore affords the buyer a longer period for in-
spection for nonconformities than payment by debit card. Second, pay-
ments rules allocate risks of fraud or error with respect to the payment
mechanism itself. For example, any payment mechanism is vulnerable to
the risk that an unauthorized person will demand payment from an obligor.
Different parties, or different classes of parties, may have different prefer-
ences about the best way to allocate these risks, either because they have
different levels of risk preference or different capacities for risk reduction
through means other than payment systems. In addition, different transac-
tional structures may warrant different treatment of each of these risks,
perhaps because different parties are in a superior position to avoid the
risks that could materialize with respect to payment in different transac-
tions. For instance, the long-distance sale of goods may warrant default
payment rules that differ from payment rules for services performed on a
face-to-face basis. Third, different payment systems entail different alloca-
tions of credit risk. Checks shift to payee-sellers (at least initially) the risk
that the drawer-buyer is insolvent. Debit and credit cards avoid that risk to
the extent that authorization for the transaction confirms a simultaneous
deduction from the user's bank account or imposes a payment obligation on
the card issuer.
In order to take advantage of these different risk allocations, parties
might prefer a menu that consists of a limited number (but greater than one)
of payments options, each accompanied by its own default rules. Faced
with such a menu, parties would have the opportunity to make a low-cost
person with implied or apparent authority would be included in the first definition, but excluded from
the second. See James Steven Rogers, The Basic Principle of Loss Allocation for Unauthorized Checks,
39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 453, 474 n.66 (2004).
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selection of a payment device that allocates risks in a manner consistent
with their particular transaction. One might respond that uniform rules are
still appropriate, as long as payment rules are only defaults, because indi-
vidual parties could bargain for highly tailored rules that best suit their own
transaction. That response would make sense if a significant majority of
parties desired the single uniform rule, so that bargaining around the de-
fault involved relatively few parties and thus minimal costs. But it may be
that no such majoritarian default exists. Instead, each of a variety of differ-
ent rules may command acceptance from a substantial minority of actors,
depending on the nature of the transaction and the relative capacity of the
parties to reduce the risks inherent in both the underlying transaction and in
the payment system. For instance, the buyer in one transaction may be rela-
tively capable of monitoring seller behavior, and thus be willing to release
funds with a limited right to reverse payment, while a buyer in another
transaction would prefer a payment mechanism that reflects the capacity of
a third-party payer to monitor the seller, and a buyer in a third transaction
may be sufficiently skeptical of seller performance that she desires to retain
the right to countermand any payment order. If the market for payments
was segmented so that parties could select among various payment sys-
tems, each of which came with well-understood, overlapping, but non-
identical default rules, then permitting parties to select from a menu of
devices may be superior to the choice between uniform default rules and a
fully bargained risk allocation. Under these circumstances, the parties in
each case would presumably prefer to select a pre-packaged, state-supplied
payment system accompanied by rules that approximated the parties' de-
sired risk allocation, rather than to bargain for that same risk allocation
where it deviated from a uniform rule.
This is not to say that standardization is never warranted. It is only to
say that uniformity must be argued for rule by rule. It may, for instance, be
possible to identify a set of transactions or transacting parties for whom the
benefits of uniformity clearly dominate, perhaps because the costs of learn-
ing the intricacies of different payment rules are not worth incurring. For
those transactions, it would be preferable to have a set of default rules that
cut across payment systems. For instance, if consumers as a group are sys-
tematically likely to be confused by a multiplicity of risk allocation rules
that would otherwise be optimal, it might be desirable to create uniform
default rules for payment systems that consumers tend to use, while allow-
ing more variation among payment systems that are more prevalent in
business transactions. But even in the case of consumers, the potential for
confusion generated by multiple payment rules must be weighed against
benefits that would be generated by diversity in payment systems rules.
2008]
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Once one considers those benefits, it is plausible that education to increase
consumer awareness would create more welfare than making legal rules
more uniform.
In this Article, we explore the parameters of the optimal standardiza-
tion of payments law. We do not attempt to determine the optimal level of
specificity for payment rules. For instance, one could imagine that a user of
a payment system, such as a credit card, could be given a variety of options
concerning matters such as fraud risk and payment risk that would be nego-
tiated or selected with every use of the card. Such "within-system" menus
would provide more detailed pre-set options than "among-system" menus
that exist when each system incorporates a single set of default rules, but
would also avoid the need to negotiate a complete set of risk allocations
from scratch with every use of the payment system. Rather than arbitrate
the appropriate degree of specificity, our objective in this article is to con-
sider the characteristics of different payment systems that a designer of
optimal rules would want to consider in defining the appropriate scope of
uniformity.
Underlying our argument is a presumption that commercial law, in-
cluding the law of payment systems, should do for parties what they would
otherwise do for themselves. 3 Achieving this objective reduces transactions
costs in commercial interactions. Implicit in that thesis is a belief that the
absence of a majoritarian default does not entail the desirability of a single
rule across payment systems. Just as the different optimal default rules for
warranties for finance leases, sales of goods and technology licenses reflect
features of those transactions, the optimal rules for payment systems
probably vary according to different transactions and transactors. There is
no more reason to believe that a single set of rules is optimal for all pay-
3. An implication of our thesis is that payment system rules should include state-supplied default
rules that are diverse across payment systems. An argument against state-supplied default rules is that
they are not needed. Parties instead can supply the terms of their payment obligations and rights at low
cost, making the setting of default rules unnecessary. Alternatively, trade groups or market participants,
such as automated clearing house associations or card system providers, can set default rules. In both
cases state-supplied default rules, whether uniform or diverse, are unnecessary. We reject this "irrele-
vance" argument. Even if the cost of providing terms that default rules otherwise provide is low, the
cost is positive. Aggregated over transactions, transaction costs are high. Default rules avoid this cost.
The possibility that private actors might supply default terms does not make state-supplied terms unim-
portant. Market structure might prevent trade groups or participants, for a significant time, from settling
on a set of default terms. The delay in adopting shared standards of container dimensions in the con-
tainer transport industry is an example; see MARC LEVINSON, THE Box 127-49 (2006). Where market
actors prefer the defaults set by the state, they are saved the cost of providing their own defaults. Mod-
est transaction cost savings and the possibility that defaults will be provided privately therefore do not
show that state-supplied defaults are unnecessary. There is a stronger case for limiting default rules to
situations that describe only a few possible states of the world, that are relatively simple in form, and
that are efficient for a wide variety of contract parties. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541,.598 (2003).
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ment devices than there is to believe that a single set of terms is optimal for
every sort of transaction that generates a payment obligation. Indeed, creat-
ing uniform legal rules may undermine the realization of uniform objec-
tives that the legal rules purport to serve. For instance, we claim below that
a general objective for allocating the risk of fraud is to place fraud losses
on the party in the best position to avoid them. But it is not clear that the
same party occupies that position across payment systems. Thus, a legal
rule that uniformly placed the risk of loss on the same party across payment
systems would fail to serve the objective that presumably motivates each
payment system.
Notwithstanding our claim that legal defaults should reflect parties'
preferences, we do not claim that payment system users systematically
select among systems based on legal rules. Many users will be unaware of
the rules that accompany their selections. Consumers in particular are likely
to be ignorant of the risk allocations embodied in legal defaults. Even those
who have some awareness of legal rules may choose among payment sys-
tems based on convenience, rather than risk allocations. A customer who
has access to both checks and a debit card may use the latter, even if she
believes that the law of checks is more consumer friendly, because swiping
a card provides an easier, quicker form of payment in a long checkout line
than writing a check. But the fact that users do not select their systems
based on legal rules does not mean that those rules are irrelevant. Users
presumably would still prefer that the rules reflect the hypothetical risk
allocation that relatively informed parties would have struck, since that
bargain is likely to have price or other ex ante effects. Certainly in a situa-
tion, such as payment systems, where there is likely to be asymmetric in-
formation (since payment system providers are likely to be aware of the
legal rules even if system users are not) creating defaults that reflect a hy-
pothetical bargain would appear useful in order to avoid advantage-taking.
The fact that users make selections among payment systems on bases
other than legal rules, however, may dilute the arguments about the desir-
ability of uniformity in some contexts. For instance, we engage the argu-
ment that uniformity in legal rules is necessary to avoid distortion in the
use of payment systems. But if users do not consider legal rules in choosing
among payment systems, then legal rules are unlikely to cause any distor-
tion. They will only have ex post distributive effects. Even with respect to
distortion, however, the proper level of uniformity may be a relevant da-
tum. First, even if many users are ignorant of or indifferent to the legal rule,
other users may be attentive, and distortion arguments are at least relevant
to them. Second, the ex post distributive effects may themselves be impor-
2008]
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tant, especially with respect to consumers, who may be the least knowl-
edgeable of the legal implications of their payment system choices.
In what follows, we elaborate on these observations and apply our the-
sis in the context of various payment system rules. The Article is in three
parts. Part I briefly describes the diversity of rules across non-cash payment
systems. Part II critically evaluates several arguments in the literature rec-
ommending uniformity in payment systems law. It concludes that the pro-
posals overestimate the reduction in information costs resulting from
standardization of rules and underestimate or ignore the benefits of a choice
among instruments with different rules. Part III makes the case that the
optimal standardization of payment system rules allows diverse rules
among payment systems. It applies Part II's argument to rules on unauthor-
ized payment, reversibility rules for credit and debit cards, and preclusion
rules for checks and wire transfers. In doing so, Part III argues that current
law in these areas does not reflect an optimal standardization in rules across
payment systems. Part III also contains a qualified defense of the distinc-
tion in some payment systems law between consumers and non-consumers
of payment instruments.
I. DIVERSITY IN PAYMENT SYSTEM RULES
The legal regime that governs any payment system typically contains
rules that allocate three different risks between the payment system pro-
vider (typically the bank that issues a card or letter of creditor on which a
check is drawn) and its user (the cardholder or drawer or payee of the
check or applicant on a letter of credit): unauthorized payment, erroneous
payment, and reversibility of payment instructions. These rules vary to a
greater or much lesser extent across payment devices.4 Rules governing
unauthorized and erroneous payment bear more similarity among payment
systems than rules governing reversibility. Even where rules governing
unauthorized and erroneous payment are generally similar, however, ex-
ceptions, liability limits, defenses, and burdens of proof vary. Case law in
some instances also creates different rules from formally similar statutory
rules, although in other cases, formal differences are diluted by judicial
decisions.5 Differences among the respective rules are in the details. More
4. See Ronald J. Mann, Making Sense of Payments Policy in the Information Age, 93 GEO. L.J.
633 (2005). For general descriptions of payments law finding more uniformity in rules than the descrip-
tion below, see Rogers, supra note 2, at 453.
5. For instance, the definition of an unauthorized use of a credit card, for which a cardholder has
very limited liability, does not include a requirement that the cardholder exercise ordinary care in
reviewing statements. That requirement does apply to limit the liability of a drawer with respect to
unauthorized checks. Nevertheless, some courts have determined that a cardholder's failure to review
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generally, payment systems law treats some of these rules as default or
mandatory rules depending on the particular payment system they control. 6
The sections below briefly describe the contours of the three rules across
principal non-cash payment systems.
A. Unauthorized Payment
The law of most non-cash payment systems places all or part of the
risk of unauthorized payment on the system provider. However, the extent
of a payment system provider's liability varies across systems. Where
payment is by check, unauthorized payment typically means either that the
drawer's signature or the payee's signature has been forged. The party
whose signature has been forged is generally not liable for payment made
under these conditions.
Similarly, an issuer of letter of credit is not entitled to reimbursement
from its applicant when it honors a draw that does not comply with the
terms of the credit. 7 The consumer credit card holder is not legally liable
for losses in excess of $50 arising from an unauthorized use of its credit
card.8 The consumer who utilizes an access device to initiate an electronic
fund transfer is liable for losses that range from $50 to the entire loss aris-
ing from unauthorized use of the device, depending on whether the lost
card is timely reported. 9 Where the unauthorized payment is by wholesale
wire transfer, the customer identified as the sender is not liable for the loss
unless the bank authenticated the payment order using a commercially rea-
sonable security procedure established with the customer; even if the bank
satisfies that condition, the customer will bear no liability if it can prove
that the order was issued by someone other than an agent who was en-
statements constitutes a grant of apparent authority, which will transform an unauthorized use into an
authorized one for which the cardholder is responsible. See Borg v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A.,
247 F. App'x 627 (6th Cir. 2007); Carrier v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 180 F. App'x 296, 297 (2d Cir.
2006); Minskoff v. Am. Express Travel Related Serv. Co., 98 F.3d 703, 709 (2d Cir. 1996).
6. Cf U.C.C. §§ 4-103(a), 4A-501(a), 5-103(c) (2005) (checks, wire transfers, and letters of
credit, respectively); 15 U.S.C. § 1643(d) (consumer credit cards); 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(e) (consumer
electronic funds transfers).
7. U.C.C. § 5-108(i).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1). The norms of the credit card industry have reduced this liability to
zero under most circumstances. See, e.g., Mastercard, Zero Liability, http://www.mastercard.com/us/
personal/en/cardholderservices/zeroliability.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2008), Visa, Zero Liability,
http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/visa-security-program/zero-liability.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2008). Cf 15 U.S.C. § 1645 (business which provides credit cards to its employees may agree not to be
subject to § 1643's liability limits).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a). See Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment
Systems, 82 VA. L. REv. 181, 183 (1996).
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trusted by the customer to act with respect to payment orders or by a person
who did not access the customer's transmitting facilities. '0
User negligence or inattention plays varied roles with respect to unau-
thorized payments. It plays a prominent role in reallocating losses in check
systems. The initial allocation to the payment system provider can be re-
versed if the user failed to take advantage of a superior position to avoid
the loss-a phrase that is not coterminous with negligence, but is at least
suggestive of its presence. 11 User failure to review bank statements and
notify the bank of forgeries will preclude that party from asserting subse-
quent forgeries by the same wrongdoer.' 2 Although check system providers
can also shift losses back to users under some circumstances that do not
expressly require individualized investigations into negligence, those cir-
cumstances involve situations where the user arguably has been presump-
tively negligent, such as by delivering a check to an imposter whose true
identity the user could have readily determined. 13 Thus, even where user
negligence is not an explicit factor in allocating losses, it may be implicit in
the legal loss allocation. A common scenario, in which an employer fails to
monitor a disloyal employee who had responsibility with respect to checks,
leads to employer liability for forgeries even if the employer was non-
negligent in its supervision. 14 But the cases suggest that negligence is the
norm in such cases, at least insofar as the employee's defalcations go unde-
tected for a significant period of time. 15 User negligence combined with a
bank's own failure to exercise ordinary in these situations will cause losses
to be divided according to a comparative contribution standard. 16
Losses in other payment systems, however, are allocated in accor-
dance with principles of authority that arguably coincide less with princi-
ples of negligence. As noted above, the loss from an unauthorized
wholesale payment order is allocated in accordance with principles of
agency law and compliance with security procedures rather than by any
reliance on negligence principles. 17 A bank that authenticates a payment
10. U.C.C. §§ 4A-202, 4A-203.
11. Id. §§ 3-404, 3-405, 3-406(a), 4-401(a). The drawer may have been negligent in the situations
where it is in a superior position to avoid the loss and failed to take precautions, but the drawer will bear
the loss in such situations even if there is no negligence.
12. Id. § 4-406(d).
13. Id. § 3-404(a).
14. Id. § 3-405.
15. See, e.g., Rodrigue v. Olin Employees Credit Union, 406 F.3d 434, 449 (7th Cir. 2005);
Panhandle Packing & Gasket, Inc. v. First United Bank, No. 07-05-0426-CV, 2007 WL 2522695, at *2
(Tex. App. Sept. 6, 2007).
16. U.C.C. §§ 3-404(d), 3-406(b), 4-406(e).
17. Id. § 4A-202(a)-(b).
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order pursuant to a reasonable security procedure to which the bank and the
customer agreed will be able to impose the loss from an unauthorized pay-
ment order, even if the customer exercised due care in protecting access to
its transmission facilities. Liability can be avoided only if the customer can
prove that the wrongdoer was not a person who acted for the customer with
respect to payment orders or the security procedure, or who accessed the
transmitting facilities of the customer. 18
Nor does negligence play any explicit role in the allocation of losses
that emerge from consumer use of credit cards and electronic fund trans-
fers. Consumer responsibility (above the $50 limitation) in those cases
depends solely on whether use of the card was "authorized." That concept,
in turn, is defined in terms of agency law, not in terms of negligence. A
consumer who writes his personal identification number on the back of his
debit card and leaves the card conspicuously on his office desk will not be
responsible beyond the statutory limit if a thief steals the card and uses it to
make purchases after discovering the PIN number on the back.19 Some
cases that involve repeated fraudulent use controversially equate failure to
review monthly statements with grants of apparent authority to use a
card.20 Those same cases imply that failure to review is indicative of user
negligence. But even those cases do not explicitly embrace negligence as
the standard of loss allocation.
Uniformity is further undermined by different definitions of "unau-
thorized" in the Truth-in-Lending Act, which governs credit cards, and the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act, which governs debit and ATM cards. The
former defines the term to include use of a credit card by a person other
than the cardholder who does not have "actual, implied, or apparent author-
ity."'2 1 The latter, however, defines an "unauthorized electronic fund trans-
fer" as a transfer initiated by a person other than the consumer "without
actual authority to initiate such transfer. '22 Taken literally, this distinction
leads to the ostensibly anomalous result that a holder of a card that could be
used for either a debit or credit transaction would be responsible if she
granted apparent authority to a third party who fortuitously hit the "credit"
18. Id. § 4A-203(a)(2).
19. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 205, supp. 1, § 205.6, cmt. 6(b), note 2 (2007).
20. See, e.g., Borg v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 247 F. App'x 627 (6th Cir. 2007);
Carier v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 180 F. App'x 296, 297 (2d Cir. 2006); Minskoff v. Am. Express Travel
Related Serv. Co., 98 F.3d 703, 709 (2d Cir. 1996).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(o)(2000).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(11).
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button while initiating the transaction, but not if that same person hit the
"debit" button.23
Diversity also extends into the scope of liability for unauthorized
payment. With respect to checks, a drawee that is liable for an unauthorized
payment is typically responsible for the amount of the check, but an unau-
thorized payment could lead to failure to honor authorized payments with
more serious consequences for the bank.24 The law governing wholesale
payment orders, on the other hand, makes no provision for consequential
damages in the event that an unauthorized payment order has been exe-
cuted. The bank must reimburse the customer only in the amount of the
debit, plus interest, upon timely notice of objection by the customer.25 The
issuer of a letter of credit that honors an unauthorized draw on the credit is
not liable to its applicant for consequential damages resulting from the
draw.26 The issuer remains liable for incidental expenses incurred by the
applicant in connection with unauthorized honor. Given the different allo-
cations of liability and limitations on recovery for unauthorized payment
across payment systems, "the risk is on the payment provider" misstates the
law.
B. Payment Error
Rules governing errors in payment are more uniform across payment
systems. As between the owner of the account erroneously charged and the
payment system provider, the latter generally bears risks of errors in the
transfer of payment. 27 Although no statutory provision expressly allocates
errors in the payment of checks, the working assumption, which permits
drawee banks to debit customers' accounts only in respect of checks that
are "properly payable," appears to allocate payment error to the payment
provider. The assignment of liability arising from the misencoding of
checks demonstrates this implicit allocation. The payor bank honoring an
23. For discussion of "smart cards" that can be used for either debit or credit functions, see Arnold
S. Rosenberg, Better than Cash? Global Proliferation of Payment Cards and Consumer Protection
Policy, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 520, 529 (2006).
24. Cf U.C.C. § 4-402(b) (payor bank liable to its customer for damages "proximately caused" by
wrongful dishonor of item). For description of the divergence in courts' allowance of recoverable
damages under section 4-402(b), see CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, ROBERT E. SCOTT & ALAN SCHWARTZ,
PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND CREDIT INSTRUMENTS 517-32 (2d ed. 2007); WILLIAM D. WARREN &
STEVEN D. WALT, PAYMENTS AND CREDITS 349-51 (7th ed. 2007).
25. See U.C.C. §§ 4A-204, 4A-402, 4A-505 & cmt.
26. Id. § 5-11 l(b) (liability for wrongful dishonor or honor of a credit).
27. The payment provider is typically allowed to recover the mistaken payment from the party
unjustly enriched by it, though a recipient of funds who received them in good faith and for value, or
who changed position in reliance of the payment, may resist claims for recovery. See, e.g., id. §§ 3-418,
4A-303(a).
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over-encoded check is liable to the drawer for the over-encoded amount
debited from its account.28 The person over-encoding the check in turn is
liable to the payor bank.29 Both the payor bank and the encoding person's
respective liabilities presuppose that the drawer does not bear the risk of
errors in payment. A letter of credit issuer is not entitled to reimbursement
from its applicant if it honors a draw in violation of the terms of the reim-
bursement agreement with the applicant. 30 For its part, the receiving bank
is liable for errors in execution of a payment order, but not for consequen-
tial damages resulting from the erroneous execution. 31 A credit or debit
card issuer is liable to a consumer cardholder for errors in charges or debits
to the cardholder's account. 32
C. Reversibility of Payment Instruction
Reversibility of a payment instruction allocates the risk of dissatisfac-
tion with the underlying transaction rather than with a fraudulent payment
transaction. A payment system user may discover that goods or services
were not as represented and thus seek to countermand an instruction previ-
ously given to the payment service provider to pay the seller of the goods
or services. The right of the payment system user to countermand that in-
struction, however, varies significantly across payment systems. Some
payment system rules allow the payment system user to countermand a
payment instruction when there is a dispute over performance of the under-
lying transaction; others do not. Those that do not are consistent with the
rules that apply in a cash transaction. Typically, a buyer who pays with
cash will bear the burden of proving the defective nature of the transaction
and will be unable to recover the payment until that burden is met. 33
Non-cash payment systems deviate from the "cash" rule in varying
degrees. For checks, the drawer has no right to have its deposit account
recredited after the payor bank has made final payment. Payment is com-
plete when the check is paid in cash or the payor bank has become obli-
28. See id. §§ 4-209 cmt. 2, 4-402(b).
29. Id. § 4-209(a).
30. Id. § 5-11 (i). The statement in the text ignores the issue raised by draws on credits containing
typographical errors in documents inconsistent with the terms of the credit. It assumes that such errors
render the documentary presentation non-complying under the controlling standard of documentary
compliance. See, e.g., Beyene v. Irving Trust Co., 762 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1985); Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank
Negara Indonesia, 41 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 618, 622-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
31. U.C.C. §§ 4A-303, 4A-402(c), 4A-305(b).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(a) (2000) (debit card); 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a)-(b) (credit card).
33. See Paul M. Shupack, Cashier's Checks, Certified Checks, and True Cash Equivalence, 6
CARD. L. REV. 467, 467 (1985).
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gated to finalize a settlement for the check. 34 Until that time, however, the
drawer may issue a stop payment order that obligates the drawee to dis-
honor a check, but only if that check has been drawn on the account of the
person issuing the stop payment order.35 A seller of goods or services may
avoid reversibility by demanding an instrument that cannot be counter-
manded because of buyer dissatisfaction, such as a cashier's check or a
teller's check.36 Thus, even within the single payments system of checks,
some diversity is permitted to respond to different preferences for allocat-
ing risks related to the underlying transaction.
The right of a consumer credit card user to countermand an instruction
for the card issuer to pay the seller is even more complicated. The right of
reversibility does not hinge on whether the card issuer has paid the seller.
Rather, it depends on the nature of the underlying dispute, the location of
the transaction, and the extent to which the card user has notified the card
issuer of the dispute. If the dispute involves the quality of the seller's per-
formance, the card user may assert against the card issuer any defense
against payment that the card user had against the merchant. At least, that is
the case if the card user has made a good faith attempt to resolve the issue
with the seller, the amount of the transaction exceeds $50, and the place
where the initial transaction occurred was in the same state as the location
of the cardholder or within 100 miles of that location.37
The rule is arguably different where the alleged defect in the underly-
ing transaction involves non-delivery rather than delivery of defective
goods or services. Under those circumstances, the card user arguably can
treat any reference to the defective transaction on a statement from the card
issuer as a billing error.38 Countermand of the transaction would not be
subject to the geographical and other limitations that apply to transactions
in which there has been faulty performance, but not nonperformance. In-
stead, the card user who gives due notice to the card issuer39 could impose
on the card issuer a duty to investigate the transaction and withhold pay-
ment of the charge reflected on the statement.
The consumer debit card user has no right similar to that of the credit
card user who desires to assert defenses against the card issuer. The debit
card user has a right to have her account recredited only if the account con-
34. U.C.C. § 4-215.
35. Id. § 4-402.
36. See id. §3-411.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1666i(a).
38. See id. § 1666(b)(3); Mann, supra note 4, at 648-49.
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a).
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tains an error.40 The relevant errors, however, are defined more narrowly
than "billing errors" for credit card purposes. A qualitatively defective
transaction, including non-delivery, arguably falls outside the statutory
scope of errors that obligate the debit card issuer to recredit the consumer's
account.41
The letter of credit is typically viewed as a mechanism for shifting to
the buyer the risk of dissatisfaction with the quality of goods. Thus, the
letter of credit issuer is obligated to make payment to the beneficiary not-
withstanding any objection from the applicant. The applicant's recourse
against the beneficiary in connection with performance of the underlying
transaction is against the beneficiary, not the issuer.42 The applicant has a
basis for countermanding the instruction to pay only if the documents that
the beneficiary presents fail to comply with the terms of the credit, or if the
applicant can satisfy the high standard of demonstrating that honor would
facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary. 43
For a wire transfer, a sender's cancellation or amendment of a pay-
ment order is effective if the receiving bank receives it when it has a rea-
sonable opportunity to act before executing the order.44 Acceptance of the
order by a receiving bank obliges the sender to pay the amount of the or-
der.45 After acceptance, cancellation may still be effective if the receiving
bank agrees or a funds-transfer system rule permits cancellation. 46 Cancel-
lation of an accepted payment order is permitted in very limited circum-
stances.47 Automated clearing house rules for non-consumer credit and
debit transfers provide for the same result.48
This brief discussion reveals the significant divergence among pay-
ment systems with respect to a variety of risks that affect both the mecha-
nism of payment and the underlying transaction. It might be thought to
provide significant fodder for the argument that payment systems are irra-
tionally diverse and that the differences in risk allocations reflect a combi-
nation of path dependence and historical contingency, rather than any well-
considered effort to design an optimal allocation of payment-related risks.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1693f.
41. Id. § 1693f(f).
42. See U.C.C. § 5-110(a)(2).
43. Id. § 5-109(a).
44. Id. § 4A-21 I(b).
45. Id. § 4A-402(c).
46. Id. § 4A-21 I(c).
47. Id. § 4A-21 1(c)(1)-(2).
48. See NAT'L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS'N, 2006 ACH RULES: CORPORATE EDITION




In the next section we outline and critique the general argument for elimi-
nating these significant differences. We ultimately contend that these ar-
guments are less persuasive than one might initially believe. That raises the
possibility, which we pursue in Part III, that substantial diversity in pay-
ment systems rules, though not necessarily the current level of diversity, is
actually optimal.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR UNIFORMITY
Diversity in rules across payments law is desirable only if the associ-
ated benefits offset the costs of learning and confusion that are minimized
by uniformity. Much academic literature and many law reform efforts as-
sume without argument that uniformity is superior. But the assumption that
uniformity is desirable is not self-evident. Because payment terms are part
of transactions calling for payment, optimal rules for payment also are part
of the optimal rules governing the transaction. The optimal set of terms
minimizes the sum of the costs of planning, performing, and enforcing the
transaction. If a single set of rules were optimal for all or most transactions,
a presumption favoring uniformity in rules would be defensible. However,
it would be miraculous if the same rules (terms) were optimal for all or
most transactions, without regard to their subject matter, the characteristics
of the transactors, and transactors' relationships to each other.49 An implied
warranty of merchantability may be an optimal implied term for most sales
of goods contracts with a merchant seller, since the merchant seller, as a
repeat player with respect to the goods, is likely to have superior informa-
tion about defect rates of the goods he or she is selling. The term is unlikely
to be optimal for typical sales contracts where the seller is a non-merchant,
since non-merchants will not necessarily have better information about the
goods than the buyer. Likewise, non-cash forms of payment can be selected
in some cases because they place risks of safety or the delay in final pay-
ment on a seller, who may be better positioned than buyers to take those
risks.50 Both examples show that a presumption favoring uniformity in
rules is not axiomatic. Proposals recommending that the same rules should
apply across non-cash payment systems therefore must be argued for, not
assumed.
49. This is the lesson of the law and economics literature on the efficient choice of contract rem-
edy, where ex ante and ex post effects make it unlikely that restitution, reliance, or expectation recover-
ies are optimal.
50. See generally Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz, Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Move
Toward a Cashless Society: A Closer Look at Payment Instruments Economics, 5 REV. NETWORK
ECON. 175 (2006), http://www.mejoumal.com/articles/garcia_swartz_I_RNEjune_2006.pdf, Hum-
phrey et al., supra note 1.
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Of the different senses of "uniformity," only uniformity in substantive
rules is at issue. Uniformity in the source of payment system rules is not.
Rules regulating forms of payment may have a single or multiple sources,
such as federal or state law or a rule-producing organization. Within federal
or state law, rules also may be better located in a single statute or regula-
tion.51 The preferable source of payments law depends in part on institu-
tional considerations about the production of legal rules. A single source of
law reduces the cost of organizing dispersed interests to initiate or alter
rules. At the same time, a single source of law also makes it easier for a
cohesive interest group to determine the output of the lawmaking body by
dominating its lawmaking process. 52 Multiple sources of law, by making
possible the production of diverse rules governing the same issue, may
make it more likely that particular rules that satisfy social interests will be
enacted. Institutional concerns about a single or multiple sources of law are
different from concerns about the desirable degree of uniformity in the
substance of rules of payments law. This Part considers and rejects some
traditional arguments for uniformity in substantive rules.
A. Article 9 as Precedent
The enactment of uniform rules governing other subjects might sug-
gest that similar uniformity is desirable for payment systems. Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code is an example of a widely adopted uniform
set of rules with very few non-uniform amendments made by enacting
states. Prior to Article 9's enactment, chattel mortgage acts, conditional
sales acts, and trust receipts acts sometimes imposed different requirements
for notice and filing, regulation of after-acquired collateral, and rules con-
cerning the debtor's continued control of collateral or proceeds. Article 9
replaced these different statutory and decisional rules with a single statute
containing the same basic rules applicable to all security interests in per-
sonal property. 53 Judged by the extent and speed at which both Article 9
and its revision have been enacted at the state level, Article 9's provision of
a uniform law for secured transactions is a success. Article 9 therefore
51. See, e.g., Fred H. Miller, A Report on the New Payments Code, 39 Bus. LAW. 1215, 1215-16
(1984) (describing reasons offered by the "348 Committee's" 1978 report recommending proposed
Uniform New Payment Code); see also infra note 54.
52. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 595, 643-44 (1995) (applied to the ALl and NCCUSL process of creating Articles 3 and 4
of the U.C.C.).
53. See U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (2000) (prerevision U.C.C., stating: "This Article applies to security
interests created by contract including pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel
trust ... conditional sale, trust receipt... ").
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might suggest that a uniform law of payment systems is desirable. Indeed,
the drafters of the proposed 1983 Uniform New Payments Code regarded
Article 9 as a favorable analogy. 54
Even if Article 9 supplies a single set of rules to govern similar trans-
actions, however, it is not a precedent for a uniform law of payment sys-
tems. The factors that might justify the same basic rules for all secured
transactions in personal property are not present with different forms of
payment. Simply put, Article 9 governs transactions involving creditors
within a fairly predictable range of abilities to provide and make use of
information, and to monitor particular assets of the debtor. For instance,
monitoring capacity may vary among types of collateral, but those who are
well positioned to monitor collateral in one form of transaction are likely to
be similarly well positioned with respect to the same form of collateral
used in another type of secured transaction.
Article 9's rules, if justified, optimally reduce the size of the debtor's
total debt bill. Because a debtor's debt bill reflects monitoring costs credi-
tors incur in connection with their loans, the debtor will issue secured debt
so as to minimize the sum of associated monitoring costs. Consistent with
this rationale, both Article 9's basic first-to-file-or-perfect rule and its ex-
ceptions allocate the debtor's assets to the superior monitor among secured
creditors. 55 From this point of view, the fact that a secured transaction in-
volves inventory or accounts or any other sort of tangible or intangible
collateral is irrelevant. Whatever the collateral, rules governing security
interests in it optimally reduce the related monitoring costs. For the same
reason, the same rules should apply to the transaction whether it takes the
form of a chattel mortgage, conditional sale, or delivery of trust receipts.
Article 9's rules rest on two assumptions about the behavior of se-
cured creditors: (1) that they use Article 9's notice filing system to discover
information about existing or potential security interests, and (2) that the
debtor and its secured creditors partition the debtor's assets among secured
creditors according to the creditors' comparative advantage at monitoring
them. If secured creditors don't use information from the notice filing sys-
tem, their monitoring won't reliably reflect that information. And if credi-
54. HALL S. SCOTT, NEW PAYMENT SYSTEMS: A REPORT TO THE 3-4-8 COMMITrEE OF THE
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1, 38-40 (1978).
55. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-322(a)(1), 9-324(a)-(b), 9-330(a)-(b), 9-332 (2005) (first-to-file-or-
perfect priority, purchase money superpriority, priority of certain chattel paper purchasers, and priority
of transferees of funds or money, respectively). Cf. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW 8-9 (2004); George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The
Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1138-39 (2004).
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tors differ markedly in their monitoring abilities, then Article 9's excep-
tions to its first-to-file-or-perfect rule might not accurately track these abili-
ties among creditors. In a spectrum of potential creditors, Article 9's rules
best reflect the characteristics of banks and finance companies, not con-
sumer creditors, sole proprietors, or small businesses. 56 These creditors
most reliably satisfy the implicit behavioral assumptions that justify a sin-
gle set of rules applicable to all secured transactions in personal property.
Where the characteristics of consumer debtors are likely diverse, revised
Article 9 either excludes from Article 9's scope a range of consumer pro-
tection rules or adopts special provisions applicable to consumers. 57 The
treatment leaves its remaining rules uniform, but also indicates that the
drafters were willing to deviate from uniformity where the rules applicable
to some transactions did not serve the overall objectives of the Article with
respect to other transactions.
In contrast, the range of transactions and characteristics of transactors
using different forms of payment is much less uniform. Some payment
systems typically involve two parties, some involve three parties, some-
but not all-implicate multiple repeat players, some-but not all-involve
sophisticated risk-reducing technology that is systematically available to a
person ordering payment, some involve other similarly sophisticated risk-
reducing technology that is systematically available to a person making
payment. The cost to payment system providers in detecting payment error
or controlling against unauthorized payment, for example, may sometimes
be less than and sometimes greater than the cost to alternative parties to the
transaction. Presumably, the parties to any payment transaction would pre-
fer the payment system provider to bear the relevant risks in the former
case, but not in the latter, since placing the risks on the parties best posi-
tioned to avoid them minimizes the costs of using the system for all parties.
Competition among payment systems would presumably allow for sorting
among these different preferences. Moreover, the characteristics and pref-
erences of payment system users are more diverse than those of creditors
who take advantage of the various applications of Article 9. Payment sys-
tem users range in their sophistication about the rules and consequences of
the form of payment they use; in addition, this sophistication varies be-
56. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-104(a), 9-327, 9-332, 9-340 (favoring banks); see also id. § 9-330
(finance companies). For the role of banks and finance companies in the early revision process of
Article 9, see Robert E. Scott, The Politics ofArticle 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1822-23 (1994); Schwartz
& Scott, supra note 52, at 638-39.
57. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-103(h), 9-626(b) (making relevant provision inapplicable to consumer-




tween consumers, sole proprietors, and small businesses. The ability to
avoid or reduce a relevant payment risk also may vary among payment
system users using different payment systems. Further, users of different
forms of payment may have different preferences as to convenience, secu-
rity of payment, access to a line of credit, and the float of funds. Equally
important may be the episodic character of the form of payment used.
Unlike the issuance of secured debt, which occurs under predictable finan-
cial conditions in the financial life of a firm,58 payment system users may
employ a form of payment in less predictable circumstances. These differ-
ences among payment system users complicate efforts to make reliable
generalizations about the expected costs and benefits of a payment rule
across payment systems. For this reason, Article 9 cannot serve as prece-
dent for a uniform law of payment systems.
B. Avoiding Confusion
Uniformity may also be advocated as a means of avoiding confusion
among payment system users.59 The argument is predicated on a contention
that different payment systems should be governed by the same rules when
they are used in the same way and as part of the same type of underlying
transaction. The similarity in use of payment instruments in part determines
the proper extent of uniformity in rules. 60 For instance, credit and debit
cards both are used to pay merchants, and most credit card holders appar-
ently do not run ongoing credit balances, although the great majority of
outstanding credit card debt at any given time is associated with revolving
debt.61 Thus, if we look at credit card use, as opposed to the amount of debt
that is associated with that use, consumer credit cards may be said to be
equivalent to debit cards in the underlying transaction of purchase. 62 Con-
sumer users generally will be unaware of the different legal consequences
attached to the respective cards. Some cards add to the confusion because
58. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1117, 1118 (2002); Allen
N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Collateral, Loan Quality, and Bank Risk, 25 J. MONETARY ECON. 21,
23-24 (1990).
59. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 4, at 655-56.
60. For Mann's qualifications, see id. at 669-70.
61. See Kathleen W. Johnson, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Convenience or Neces-
sity? Understanding the Recent Rise in Credit Card Debt 1-3 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Staff
Working Paper No. 2004-47, 2004), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/FEDS/2004/
200447/200447pap.pdf.
62. Note that we are not saying that this is the appropriate way to look at the issue. It would be
perfectly logical to consider the amount of debt, rather than the number of users of credit cards, in order
to determine whether credit card use should be considered primarily a convenience device or a borrow-
ing device and to structure the related legal rules.
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they can be used to initiate either a debit or a credit transaction, with the
choice potentially made by someone other than the consumer. Accordingly,
with respect to payment system rules bearing on the underlying transaction,
the rules for consumer credit and debt cards should be the same.
At the outset, it is notable that there is an anomaly about this argu-
ment: standing alone, it is agnostic about the substance of the rule that gov-
erns the transactions. What is important is uniformity. Thus, for instance, in
the context of reversibility, it does not matter for purposes of the "same
payment function, same payment rule" principle whether the uniform rule
should (1) allow all cardholders to assert against issuers the defenses they
have against merchants, or (2) prohibit all cardholders from raising these
defenses. It is partially for that reason that the principle of equivalent func-
tion seems to be a questionable basis for justifying uniformity. The princi-
ple is insensitive to factors bearing on the optimal allocation of relevant
payment risks. If the factors underlying optimal risk allocation for each
payment system happen to dictate the same loss-allocation rule, then uni-
formity would be appropriate. But uniformity would be appropriate as a by-
product of the fact that the same risk allocation is optimal for each system,
not as an independent objective, to be pursued regardless of its conse-
quences for optimal risk allocation.
Anomaly aside, the argument from confusion ultimately falters on
more direct grounds. Payment system diversity imposes two kinds of costs
related to confusion. First, it imposes learning costs on those who consider
the possibility that different rules will apply and wish to dispel confusion.
Second, it imposes error costs on those who are unaware of or miscompre-
hend the various legal rules that accompany different payment systems and
who find themselves bound by legal rules that they did not anticipate. We
refer to the combination of learning costs and error costs as "confusion
costs." Of course, any costs imposed by confusion must be weighed against
the benefits that payments diversity confers. As we have argued throughout
this Article, alleviating confusion through uniform rules may require allo-
cating risks in an otherwise suboptimal way. If payments diversity permits
parties to select at low cost a payment mechanism that reflects the best risk
allocation for their transaction, then any learning or error costs related to
confusion or its avoidance may be swamped by the costs related either to
inefficient risk assignments or to the transactions costs involved in bargain-
ing away from the uniform default. We have no definitive answer to this
empirical issue. Nevertheless, a variety of considerations suggest to us that
the risk of substantial confusion from an ideal level of payments diversity
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is sufficiently low that concerns for learning and error costs do not warrant
full uniformity.
Current law, at least occasionally, appears to recognize this balance.
There are cases under current law in which confusion costs could be high.
But current law has already adjusted for those situations, even at the risk of
compromising desirable payments diversity. The primary example can be
found in the treatment of debit cards. Debit card transactions come in two
forms: those predicated on a PIN that is processed electronically, and those
predicated on a signature that may be processed "offline" in a manner that
corresponds to the processing of traditional credit card transactions. The
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) governs the rights of consumers who
engage in electronic fund transfers, and defines those transactions as "any
transfer of funds... which is initiated through an electronic terminal, tele-
phonic instrument, or computer or magnetic tape."' 63 Regulation E of the
Federal Reserve Board, however, provides a more expansive definition. It
includes within the scope of "electronic fund transfer," any transfer "result-
ing from debit card transactions, whether or not initiated through an elec-
tronic terminal." 64 The effect of Regulation E is to subject offline debit
card transactions to the liability and error resolution schemes of the EFTA,
even where no electronic communication is involved. The justification for
the expansion lies largely in the risk of confusion from more rigid distinc-
tions among payment mechanisms. Users of debit cards are unlikely to
consider the possibility that cards that have the same financial effect-
prompt withdrawal of funds from the user's bank account-will be accom-
panied by different legal consequences depending on what will seem to the
user to be an irrelevant consideration, that is, whether the merchant secured
authorization for the transaction by requesting the cardholder to provide a
signature or a PN.65 The distinction that triggers the application or avoid-
ance of the formal definition of an electronic fund transfer-the process by
which the seller collects payment-is both hidden from and irrelevant to
the cardholder. Thus, the cardholder is likely to be unaware of and con-
fused by the legal distinctions. Indeed, consumer confusion is likely to be
even greater where the same debit card can support both PIN- and signa-
ture-based card transactions. 66 Thus, even if the risks associated with signa-
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (2000).
64. 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(v) (2007).
65. Electronic Fund Transfers; Final Rule and Update to Official Staff Commentary, 49 Fed. Reg.
40,794, 40, 794-95 (Oct. 18, 1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 205).
66. See Julia S. Cheney, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., An Update on Trends in the Debit Card
Market 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Payment Cards Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 07-07, 2007), avail-
able at http://ssm.com/abstractl1007276 (reporting that 85% of debit cards now offer both signature
and PIN authorization capabilities).
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ture- and PIN-based systems might otherwise warrant different risk alloca-
tion rules, such as different rates of fraud, 67 or different processing costs, 6 8
the confusion costs related to imposing legal distinctions between the sys-
tems will likely be sufficiently great to warrant applying the same rules to
both. And that is exactly what the current regulations provide.
Other examples of similarly obvious risk of confusion, however, are
difficult to identify. True, at some level of abstraction users of payment
systems might be confused about the application of different legal regimes
to different payment systems. Thus, a user might protest that he or she had
no expectation that rules governing risk allocations with respect to checks
would be different from rules governing risk allocations with respect to
currency, since both deal with forms of payment. But the apparent dissimi-
larities among different payment systems should often be sufficient to place
even untrained users on notice that rules could vary. Our claim, however, is
not that payment system users should be charged with notice of the law.
Rather, our claim is more pragmatic and empirical: given the obvious dif-
ferences in payment systems, significant confusion is unlikely to material-
ize outside the debit card arena where it has been properly addressed. As
our summary of current risk allocation suggests, a payment system predi-
cated on allocating losses to parties in the best position to avoid them will
likely be characterized by substantial similarity, because the party in the
best position to avoid a particular risk with respect to one payment system
will also likely be in the same position with respect to other payment sys-
tems. If, for instance, payment system users are best positioned to detect
and provide notice of the theft of cash and checks, they are also likely fre-
quently to be best positioned, relative to other parties to the transaction, to
detect and provide notice with respect to theft of credit cards and debit
cards. Thus, we would expect obligations to provide notice to be similar
among all these systems. Some differences in timing might be expected,
but they will come into play only on rare occasions, since most payment
system users are likely to notice large discrepancies in their account shortly
after being defrauded and within the period allotted for notice in all pay-
ment systems. As a result, opportunities for confusion will tend to be
minimal.
67. Signature-based debit cards appear to be more vulnerable to fraud than PIN-based debit cards.
According to Victor Lubasi, PIN-based debit card fraud losses amount to 0.022% of the value of trans-
actions, and signature-based debit card fraud losses amount to 0.026% of the value of transactions.
Victor Lubasi, Debit Card Competition: Signature Versus PIN, CHI. FED LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank
of Chi., Chicago, 111.), Dec. 2005.
68. See id.
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As we indicated at the beginning of this section, one plausible area of
confusion that the law does not currently unify involves credit cards and
debit cards. The cards look identical in many respects, and are used in simi-
lar ways, such as by providing account numbers and expiration dates to the
representative of a seller or typing the same information into a website.
Transactions involving cards tend to be susceptible to monitoring in the
same way, through maintaining physical possession of the cards and in-
specting statements for unauthorized transactions. Indeed, some cards may
be used for both credit and debit transactions. While the cardholder's selec-
tion of the desired type of transaction might be a signal that different legal
rules flow from the choice, it would not be unreasonable for a consumer to
believe that his or her choice affected only whether an immediate debit was
made from a demand deposit account. Thus, the similarities could lull a
cardholder into the belief that both types of transactions are covered by the
same legal rules.
The rules relating to credit and debit cards diverge in two of the areas
with which we are concerned in this Article. The first is the area of "unau-
thorized use." The second is the area of reversibility. With respect to the
first, we anticipate that confusion costs will be quite low. One source of
divergence in this area is that the definition of "unauthorized use" differs in
each setting. We have indicated above that the divergent definitions of
"unauthorized use" may be a function of legislative inattention or drafting
inconsistency rather than anything related to the different risks presented
by the different systems. If that is the case, then the costs related to confu-
sion should certainly trump the causes of rule diversity. We see little reason
not to make the definitions uniform. Here, however, confusion costs are
likely to be very small. We anticipate few instances in which implied or
apparent authority-the predicate for the broader credit card liability-is
present, but actual authority is not. Our examination of the current case law
reveals few reported instances in which consumer liability for third-party
use of a credit card has rested on the presence of implied or apparent au-
thority and that would likely have been decided differently had the debit
card standard been applied. Most "apparent authority" cases have involved
firms whose employees had fraudulently obtained credit cards in the name
of their employers, and the employers failed to detect the improper use
made of the cards notwithstanding the receipt of statements indicating the
employees' misfeasance. 69
69. See, e.g., Minskoffv. Am. Express Travel Related Serv. Co., 98 F.3d 703 (2d Cir. 1996); DBI
Architects, P.C. v. Am. Express Travel Related Serv. Co., inc., 388 F.3d 886 (D.C. Cir. 2004). For a
rare case in which an individual was deemed to have given apparent authority for credit card use, see
New Century Financial Services, Inc. v. Dennegar, 928 A.2d 48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
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The rules for credit cards and debit cards also diverge with respect to
the consequences, as opposed to the definition, of unauthorized use. As we
have explained above, credit card users face less liability than debit card
users in situations where the cardholder has failed to give the card issuer
notice of unauthorized transactions. In both cases, the cardholder is liable
for unauthorized use of a card only if the card is an "accepted" card, the
liability is not in excess of $50, and the cardholder has notified the card
issuer of the loss of the card or unauthorized use. 70 But differences appear
where notice is not forthcoming. With respect to credit cards, cardholders
bear a maximum of $50 liability until the card issuer has been notified that
an unauthorized use has occurred. The rules are more complicated in the
case of debit cards. The $50 liability cap may be exceeded, first to $500,
and then to an unlimited amount, if the consumer fails to notify the finan-
cial institution within relevant time periods that an unauthorized transfer
has occurred. 71 This is a distinction with a difference and could generate
confusion costs to cardholders unaware of the difference.
But the presence of confusion costs does not mean either (1) that con-
fusion costs are unjustified, or (2) that they can easily be eliminated by a
uniform legal rule. With respect to the possibility that the costs are justi-
fied, note that the different functions of credit and debit cards expose card-
holders and card issuers to different risks. Credit cards expose the party
bearing the risk of unauthorized use to the full amount of the account credit
limit, which will likely exceed the amount of the cardholder's assets that
the card issuer holds. Unauthorized use of debit cards, however, will ex-
pose the party bearing that risk only to the amount available in the card-
holder's account, though some overdraft privileges may be available. These
different risks may warrant different risk allocations. The decision to cap
cardholder liability, even when notice has not been given, may reflect a
belief that, by determining that the cardholder deserves credit in excess of
available assets, the card issuer has indicated its capacity to monitor use of
the card and its superior ability to enforce authorization requirements
against merchants who accept the card from unauthorized users. The debit
card holder, on the other hand, arguably already has significant incentives
to protect the assets in his or her related account. Thus, the customer may
be expected both to provide prompt notice and to suffer the risk of failing
to do so.
Second, alleviating confusion costs between credit cards and debit
cards could increase confusion costs with respect to other payment systems.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a).
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Assume that debit card rules concerning notice and liability were more
consistent with credit card rules. That might reduce confusion costs for
those who identified credit cards and debit cards as similar forms of pay-
ment. But that is not the only parallel that one might draw from an exami-
nation of different forms of payment. It is equally plausible that a payment
system user would equate debit cards and checks. Both those forms of
payment involve direct debits from the customer's checking account that
are made with presentation of the authorization (in paper or electronic
form) to withdraw funds from the account. Thus, an informed customer
might expect the legal rules on unauthorized withdrawals from checking
accounts to be the same regardless of form. The structure of the notice and
liability schemes for debit cards and checks do tend to be consistent,
though not identical. In each case, the customer bears no liability for future
unauthorized transactions once the bank is placed on notice of existing or
potential misuse, but bears liability up to the amount of the improper with-
drawals in the event that the customer fails to detect the unauthorized with-
drawals after the bank provides a record of the transaction and after some
period in which unauthorized debits should have been detected. The time
periods that trigger liability for the different systems vary, and arguably
warrant more uniformity, but the basic scheme does not. As a result, efforts
to make the debit card liability system more like the credit card system
would detach the links between debit card and check liability systems.
The argument for avoiding confusion is no less problematic in the case
of reversibility. Credit card rules allow the cardholder a limited right to
assert against the card issuer claims or defenses that the cardholder has
against the merchant that accepted the card in payment. Debit cards, even
debit cards used in a manner that creates an overdraft, entail no such
right.72 Again, at least one form of the argument for uniformity begins with
the proposition that users of credit and debit cards use their cards inter-
changeably. That is, many credit card users do not necessarily use their
credit card as a source of credit, since they pay the balance in full on a
monthly basis (although, again, the great majority of outstanding debt
represents revolving rather than convenience use). 73 Thus, the argument
goes, credit card users will be surprised to learn that the rights that they
have with respect to reversing credit card transactions do not equally apply
to debit cards.74
72. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c).
73. See Mann, supra note 4, at 656 n.107 (citing CARDDATA, BANK CREDIT CARD CONVENIENCE
USAGE-CURRENT, available at http://www.cardweb.com/carddata/charts/convenience-usage.amp
(subscription required)).
74. See, e.g., id. at 634.
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This argument gives rise to at least two objections. First, it assumes
that credit card users will be aware of the credit card reversibility rule, and
thus will use it as a baseline for "similar" debit card transactions. Unlike
the case of unauthorized use rules, which card issuers advertise in order to
induce cardholders to take advantage of "zero liability," we are dubious
that most credit card users are aware of the right to assert against the issuer
claims that they have against the merchant. Indeed, it is equally plausible
that consumers believe that the baseline rule is that they must pay their
credit card issuer and seek recourse against the merchant. The question is
an empirical one to which we have no definitive response. But we note that
credit card issuers do not appear to advertise the "third-party defenses"
right in the same manner that they advertise "zero liability." If consumers
are unaware of their legal rights with respect to either credit or debit cards,
there is little reason to suspect that consumer confusion involves disap-
pointment that debit cards do not follow the credit card rule, or happy sur-
prise that credit cards do not follow the debit card rule. It would, of course,
be better if cardholders were aware of their legal rights. Our claim is not
that we benefit from consumer ignorance. Our claim is only that the current
state of consumer knowledge suggests that confusion is not the problem.
The second objection to the confusion argument is that, as in the case
of unauthorized use, the same risk in different payment systems entails
different costs, so that there is little reason to confront that risk with a uni-
form rule. In the case of reversibility, the related costs involve the extent to
which reversibility requires incurring the costs of a completed transaction.
It is technically correct that both credit card and debit card transactions can
be undone, but that does not mean that the processes are identical. In the
case of a credit card, reversing the transaction will mean undoing a chain of
debits and credits between the merchant and the card issuer. It typically
will not, however, mean undoing the flow of funds between the credit card
holder and the card issuer, as long as the dispute arises prior to the time the
cardholder paid the card issuer with respect to the transaction. Thus, the
cardholder has always maintained the funds reflecting the purchase price in
the disputed transaction over the course of the dispute. In a debit card
transaction, however, the cardholder's account will already have been deb-
ited the amount of the purchase price. The current reversibility rule for
debit cards leaves those funds with the merchant. Reversing the transaction
requires undoing the transfer from the cardholder's account as well as the
transaction between the card issuer and the merchant.
Is that step sufficient to shift the balance of costs and benefits? That
seems unlikely in a computerized age. But the additional step reveals an
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additional significance to the distinction between credit cards and debit
cards, and one that may be worth retaining. In each case, current law im-
poses on the party who seeks the funds the burden of litigation to recover
the purchase price. Thus, the question is whether a single reversibility rule
for both credit and debit card transactions optimally allocates the litigation
burden between the cardholder and the merchant. The longstanding rule for
irreversibility with respect to cash transactions suggests that there may be
some value in allowing parties to structure their dealings in a manner that
allocates the burden to the party who has parted with funds, notwithstand-
ing the technical feasibility of returning the cash. For instance, no technical
infeasibility precludes a rule that requires merchants to return cash to con-
sumers pending the outcome of a dispute. Our unwillingness to apply such
a rule implicitly recognizes either that the related costs are too great, or that
the probabilities with respect to outcome on the merits favor the merchant
and thus places the litigation burden on the party whom we believe is likely
to lose.
As we discuss below, it is not clear whether such an implicit conclu-
sion is justified. We are not aware of the rate at which disputes between
consumers and merchants are decided on the merits in favor of the former.
There are reasons to think that merchants will avoid dispute-producing
behavior, both because of their relationships with card networks and their
reputational stake in satisfying card holders. 75 On that rationale, it is the
credit card rule that appears anomalous. Our point here, however, is not
that either the credit card rule or the debit card rule is the correct one.
Rather, our limited point in this section is to demonstrate that, given plau-
sible arguments for each, a menu approach that reflects either different
costs or, where costs are unclear, different choices, may be preferable to
imposed uniformity. That choice entails potential for residual confusion
may be a call for conveying better information to consumers, but is not
necessarily a justification for dissolving the relevant distinctions.
Finally, reversibility poses the problem that resolving potential confu-
sion between credit cards and debit cards risks exacerbating confusion be-
tween debit cards and checks. A consumer who used a check to pay for the
defective transaction, or who removed cash from his or her checking ac-
count, would have had no right to assert against the bank any claim or de-
fense valid against the merchant once the payment was final. The debit
card, which accesses the same demand deposit account, retains the same
principle. It simply expedites the time of final payment relative to a check.
75. See Mann, supra note 4, at 661-62.
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But given that a consumer could understand that debit cards and checks are
equivalents for purposes of gaining access to a demand deposit account,
making debit card rules parallel to credit card rules could cause confusion
costs for consumers no less than the confusion costs created by distinguish-
ing between credit cards and debit cards for purposes of notice or reversi-
bility.
Of course, the natural response is to contend that confusion in either
case could be alleviated if all three payment systems (credit cards, debit
cards, checks) were governed by the same rules. But to say that is to sug-
gest that the risks aligned with all three systems are equivalent and that
users would not benefit from having a choice among systems that allocate
risks differently. We have suggested that there may be reasons to distin-
guish among these systems, based on superior risk-bearing potential. We
extend that argument in the next Part of this Article. For the moment, we
suggest only that confusion costs, standing alone, do not justify uniform
treatment of payment systems. Parties to payments transactions presumably
would incur some confusion costs if doing so minimized other risks of
greater value. There is little reason for the law, in the name of uniformity,
to create default rules that vary from the rules for which most parties would
bargain.
C. Eliminating Distortion from Legal Rules
Another principal argument offered for uniformity is that the presence
of different legal rules for different forms of payment distorts choice
among payment systems.76 If the same risk (e.g., fraud in the payments
system or in the underlying transactions) is present across payment sys-
tems, and if payment system users and providers are similarly situated with
respect to them, the allocation of the risk should be the same across pay-
ment systems. Legal rules that assign the relevant risk differently create
different costs for using different forms of payment. If the relevant risk
across payment systems is the same, a divergence between legal rules bi-
ases the choice of payment system unrelated to the costs created by the
rules. Uniformity in payment system rules allegedly eliminates those costs.
A standard illustration of this phenomenon involves the different legal
rules pertaining to the unauthorized use of checks and debit cards. The
person in whose name a check is issued is liable for the amount of a forged
check if the making of the unauthorized signature is the result of that per-
76. See SCOTT, supra note 54, at 39-40; UNIF. NEW PAYMENTS CODE (Permanent Editorial Bd.
for the U.C.C., P.E.B. Draft No. 3, June 2, 1983); Miller, supra note 51, at 1216.
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son's negligence. 77 By contrast, unless otherwise provided by contract, the
non-consumer debit cardholder is liable for debits resulting from use of its
debit card. The cardholder's liability is limited by the amount of the bal-
ance in the debited account, plus any overdraft privileges that the unauthor-
ized user can exploit. If the debit cardholder is a consumer, he or she is
liable for no more than $50, assuming timely notice of unauthorized use,
even if negligent with respect to the use. 78 Assuming that the risk of unau-
thorized use is the same for checks and debit cards, and that users of checks
and debit cards have the same capacities to control against unauthorized
use, different rules concerning unauthorized use distorts the user's choice
of payment by check or debit card.
The choice among payment instruments governed by different rules
raises two different questions. One is whether the difference in rules dis-
torts the choice of payment instrument. Here, we assume that the parties are
aware of the different legal rules, since distortion can occur only if the se-
lection is made on the basis of the legal differences. This assumption, we
suspect, is highly counterfactual, as we surmise that the great majority of
payment system users are unaware of the legal consequences of their
choices. Nevertheless, we are willing to make the assumption in order to
test the distortion argument. The second question is whether the difference
is justified by overriding considerations, even if the distortion exists. Take
the questions in turn. First, is there in fact a "distortion" in the choice of
payment instrument that uniform rules need to address? The answer to that
question, in turn, depends on the relevant risks allocated by different legal
rules being equivalent. Different rules in payment systems distort choice
only if the risks and capacities for controlling them are the same across
payment systems. If the selection among payment instruments is the conse-
quence of a reaction to different risks, then the opportunity to select among
instruments may actually lead to optimal risk allocations, rather than to a
socially undesirable distortion. Thus, before we can confidently conclude
that check writers and card holders are similarly situated with respect to
unauthorized use of their payment systems, we would want to know the
risks they face, the average size of the withdrawal made through each sys-
77. See U.C.C. § 3-406(a) (2005). Is that person a drawer of the check? Arguably, yes. A "drawer"
is person "who signs or is identified in a draft as a person ordering payment." U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(5). The
person whose drawer's signature is forged on a check is "identified" as a person ordering payment.
Perhaps the "identified" language was meant only to cover agency relationships, not unauthorized
signatures. However, at least one court has classified the person whose signature was forged as a
drawer, and thus precluded that person from bringing a conversion action under U.C.C. section 3-
420(a). See Borg v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 247 F. App'x 627 (6th Cir. 2007).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a)(1) (consumer's liability not to exceed the lesser of $50 or the amount of
the property or services obtained in the transaction).
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tern and the variance around that mean when that risk materializes, and the
costs of avoiding risks within each system.
To continue our example of checks and debit cards, it seems apparent
that the risks of using these different mechanisms are not equivalent. Con-
sider the drawer and non-consumer debit cardholders' respective losses
when negligent. Safety, record keeping, budget control, negotiability, and
the float make checks a preferred means of making large dollar payments. 79
Debit cards, by contrast, typically are used to make smaller dollar pay-
ments; 80 the average value of debit card payments in 2003 was $40.81 The
average loss in a check fraud case in 2003 was $1098.82 At the same time,
the average value of losses per debit card fraud case was $294 for signature
debit cards and $371 for PIN-based debit cards. 83 We also suspect that the
rate of fraud is lower for debit card transactions than for checks. The 2004
ABA Deposit Account Fraud Survey Report notes that banks surveyed in
2003 reported one loss claim per 29,923 debit card transactions. 84 While
we have been unable to find reliable comparable figures for checks, there is
anecdotal evidence that fraud rates are higher. During that same period,
36.6 billion checks were written. 85 The ABA Deposit Account Fraud Sur-
vey Report received survey forms from 417 of the 5,081 banking institu-
tions to which forms were sent.86 These 417 institutions alone reported
616,469 check fraud cases.87 Assuming they were representative, the 5,081
recipients of the survey would have suffered approximately 7.5 million
instances of check fraud for a ratio of one fraud claim for every 4880
checks. In addition, banks report much greater concern about check fraud
than debit card fraud.88
Risks also arise from very different sources for checks and debit cards.
Debit card fraud arises from the theft of the physical card, a related access
device such as a PIN, or both. Check fraud arises from forged indorse-
79. See Garcia-Swartz et al., supra note 50, at 188-91; David B. Humphrey, Payment Systems:
Principles, Practices and Improvements (World Bank, Technical Paper No. 260, 1995).
80. In 2003 the average value of checks was $1,065; in 2000 it was $951. Geoffrey R. Gerdes et
al., Trends in the Use of Payment Instruments in the United States, 91 FED. RES. BULL. 180, 182 (2005).
Checks remain the most common form of non-cash payment instrument by value, excluding wire
transfers. See id. at 181 & n.6.
81. Id. at 183; Cheney, supra note 66, at 3. They are the most common instrument used to make
small-value payments, except for cash. Gerdes et al., supra note 80, at 183.
82. AM. BANKERS ASS'N, ABA DEPOSIT ACCOUNT FRAUD SURVEY REPORT 13 (2004).
83. Id. at 41.
84. Id.
85. See Gerdes et al., supra note 80, at 181.
86. AM. BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 82, at 3.
87. Id. at 13.
88. See id. at 11.
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ments, forged drawer signatures, counterfeiting, alteration, and check kiting
schemes. This combination of different expected losses and different
sources of unauthorized use suggest that cost-justified loss avoidance
measures will also differ, both for payment system users and payment sys-
tem providers. The higher average value of checks, for instance, may jus-
tify a drawee bank in honoring a check of a certain amount without undue
suspicion, while a debit card transaction of the same amount might raise
questions, especially if banks have the capacity to track the spending pat-
terns of their customers. Some of these differences may result from the fact
that debit cards are more likely to be used by consumers, while businesses
may continue to be users of checks. It is, therefore, plausible that we would
want different rules for consumer and non-consumer payment system users.
We explore that issue below. At this point, we note only that the underlying
assumption of the distortion argument, that is, that superficially similar
payment systems present similar risks that will be distorted by dissimilar
legal rules, is highly suspect. There is little reason to conclude that the op-
timal rule for unauthorized use will be uniform for checks and debit
cards. 89
The second question is whether overriding considerations justify dif-
ferent legal rules across payments instruments even if they distort choice.
The argument from distortion assumes that distortion in the choice of pay-
ment instrument justifies the uniform rules across payment systems. The
assumption is unsound. Attitudes toward risk might justify different legal
rules, even if the expected value of fraud losses were the same across pay-
ment instruments. Consumers, for instance, might be risk-averse over some
outcomes. In transactions where such outcomes are possible, they might
prefer to allocate the relevant risk to another party. Diversity in rules allows
risk-averse consumers to select easily the payment instrument suitable for
them. For instance, the effective zero liability for a debit card may be ap-
pealing to a consumer who is risk-averse with respect to unauthorized use.
Such a consumer may prefer to pay by debit card rather than by check,
even if debit card transactions require payment of a risk premium. Accord-
ingly, the different limits might justify different loss-allocation rules for
debit cards than for checks issued by consumers.
89. Cf Gillette, supra note 9, at 223-25 (making point in connection with liability limits on
checks and credit cards).
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III. OPTIMAL STANDARDIZATION IN PAYMENT SYSTEMS
A. General Principles
We suggested at the outset that parties who use payment systems
might prefer diversity in legal rules rather than uniformity. Our rationale is
that parties to different transactions, or different types of parties in similar
transactions might prefer to allocate risks differently. A menu of legal rules
allows parties to structure their transaction at the lowest possible cost by
selecting a payment system that best approximates their optimal allocation
of the legal risks that attend payment. This is not to say, however, that cur-
rent payments rules or payment systems achieve the optimal level of diver-
sity.
Notwithstanding our view that parties might have different prefer-
ences about how to allocate the payment risks in a particular transaction,
we believe that they would share a common view about what the legal rules
of each payment system should accomplish. The law of payment systems is
composed primarily of default rules; parties could, for the most part, rede-
fine the risk allocation created by the legal rules. Presumably, therefore, the
legal rules that govern any payment system should reflect the preferences
of most parties who use that payment system. Legal rules that reflect ma-
joritarian preferences minimize the costs that must be incurred to complete
that transaction, because most parties do not need to negotiate about the
legal rules. They can simply adopt the state-supplied default rules. Only
idiosyncratic parties will be required io negotiate around the defaults.
We further assume that, in most cases, parties to any payment system
would prefer legal default rules that allocate any risk to the party in the best
position to avoid it. Basically, that requires placing the loss on the party
who can minimize the sum of loss avoidance costs and residual losses that
remain even once cost-effective precautions are taken. That principle, well
recognized in the literature90 and case law9' on payment systems, mini-
mizes transactions costs, because allocation of a risk to an inferior risk
bearer will require that party to charge costs for risk bearing that could be
reduced if the risk were assigned to the superior risk bearer. A legal rule
that placed the loss on the superior risk bearer would avoid the costs of
90. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision ofArticles 3 and 4, 42
ALA. L. REV. 551, 566-67 (1991).
91. See. e.g., TD Banknorth, N.A. v. Keybank, N.A., No. 05-180-P-H, 2006 WL 1554712, at **5-
6 (D. Me. June 2, 2006); Washtenaw Mortgage Co., Inc. v. Nat'l City Bank, No. 04-239-JBC, 2006 WL
1207651, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 28, 2006).
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contracting around the inefficient rule or of absorbing excess social losses
due to friction in the contracting process. The law with respect to fraudu-
lent signatures on checks appears most explicitly to adopt this rationale.
The current interplay of bank liability for unauthorized payments, unless
the person asserting lack of authority was himself negligent or could more
readily monitor the wrongdoer, is best explained as embodying a system in
which losses are allocated to the party in the best position to avoid them. 92
The assumption that most participants in a payment system would pre-
fer to allocate losses to the party in the best position to avoid them needs
careful statement. It requires a full understanding of what it means to be in
a superior position to avoid a loss. One party can be in a superior position
to avoid one element that contributes to the loss while another party is bet-
ter positioned to avoid another element of it. Further, a party may be in an
inferior position to avoid risks given current technology, but be in a supe-
rior position to develop new technology that avoids or reduces loss. 93 Al-
ternatively, informational asymmetries may mean that one party is well
positioned to take precautions against a loss, but another party has superior
information that is necessary to determine the expected value of taking
those precautions. In such a case, it would be desirable to have a legal rule
that induced the party with superior information to convey it to the unin-
formed party or to develop precautionary measures that can be utilized by
the less informed party. For instance, banks, as repeat players in the pay-
ment system, will have superior information relative to any given customer
about schemes used to defraud individual customers. Bank customers, on
the other hand, are in a superior position to take certain precautions that
will protect their accounts against theft or fraud. Placing the loss of fraud
on banks induces them to invest optimally in creating fraud detection and
deterrence methods that can best be implemented by customers. These
include issuing warnings about false keypads at ATM machines, the instal-
lation of mirrors and security at ATM machines, recommendations for
"commercially reasonable" security procedures for wire transfers, and posi-
tive pay systems for checks. Thus, with respect to these risks, legal rules
should induce banks to take fraud detection and deterrent measures that
they are best able to implement, and should induce customers to take those
precautions that they are best able to implement. But the contingent nature
of the desirable precautions and technological development make it
92. See U.C.C. § 3-405 cmt. 1 (2005) (explaining "employee responsibility" rule as "based on the
belief that the employer is in a far better position to avoid the loss by care in choosing employees, in
supervising them, and in adopting other measures to prevent forged indorsements on instruments pay-
able to the employer or fraud in the issuance of instruments in the name of the employer").
93. See Mann, supra note 4, at 638.
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unlikely that the same party will have a comparative advantage with respect
to all relevant losses or across all payment systems.
The majoritarian preference for optimal risk allocation is subject to
two caveats. First, some parties to transactions that involve payment sys-
tems may be averse to certain risks and thus prefer to shift related losses to
other parties, regardless of who is in a superior position to avoid the loss.
For instance, individuals, such as consumers or sole proprietors, may be
more concerned with loss avoidance than with optimal risk bearing, and the
law is perhaps more likely to be responsive to issues of risk aversion in the
case of individuals. 94 Risk-aversion, however, is not limited to individuals.
Firms insure against some risks even when not required by regulation or
rules of corporate governance, and some individuals forgo insurance.
Nonetheless, consumers probably are more frequently averse to risk than
firms. Equally as important, being a consumer is a more reliable and less
manipulable characteristic better correlated with attitudes toward risk than
easily verifiable characteristics of firms. If parties other than consumers are
reliably and easily identifiable as risk-averse, payment rules allocating loss
may reflect their preference that risk be shifted away from them.
The second caveat is that, notwithstanding the general desire to mini-
mize the sum of losses and loss avoidance in any payment system, there
may be circumstances under which other objectives trump efficient risk
bearing. As we discuss below, these objectives may address distributive
concerns, where it can be demonstrated that efficient risk allocation sys-
tematically places losses on a social group that we desire to protect from
risk bearing. Indeed, under those circumstances, it is possible that the so-
cially optimal rule would be a mandatory rule that is imposed uniformly
across the payment systems used by the group to be protected.
This Part argues that the factors that determine optimal risk bearing do
not readily lend themselves to the identification of a single majoritarian
default rule for all payment systems. Those factors may point to different
risk bearing advantages in different transactions and for different transac-
tors. Under these circumstances, parties to transactions may prefer a menu
of risk allocation rules from which they can select one that best approxi-
mates their risk preferences to a single rule around which significant bar-
gaining must occur. In what follows, we consider a variety of different
risks and demonstrate the difficulty of deriving a single optimal default.
The consequence is that variety in the legal rules that allocate these risks
may be superior to uniformity. That is not to say that the current level of
94. The market for managers and the presence of competition among firms suggest that there is
less reason for legal intervention to address risk aversion in that context.
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legal variety is itself optimal. Indeed, throughout this section, we suggest
how current law deviates from what we would consider an optimal level of
diversity in payments rules. It is only to say that uniformity is not necessar-
ily the cure for suboptimal variety. The remaining sections of this Part ar-
gue that diverse payments rules can better allocate relevant risk.
B. Unauthorized Payments
The possibility of fraudulent or unauthorized use constitutes one of the
major risks that attend any payments system. Our assumption that commer-
cial law should do for the parties what they would otherwise do for them-
selves suggests that uniform treatment of fraud risks may be appropriate at
a high level of generality. That is, consistent with the common understand-
ing that legal rules should minimize the costs of payment systems, each
system should allocate the loss of unauthorized use to the party in the best
position to avoid it. As noted above, left to their own devices parties would
likely bargain to that allocation in order to minimize the total of fraud costs
and anti-fraud precautions.
Nevertheless, some of the caveats that we associated with the optimal
risk bearing are particularly salient with respect to unauthorized payments.
As between the system provider and system user, different parties may be
the superior risk bearers with respect to different types of fraud; moreover,
a superior risk bearer under one technology may not be the superior risk
bearer under an alternative technology, so the identification of the superior
risk bearer could be endogenous. In addition, the risk that bank customers
may be vulnerable to significant losses as a consequence of unauthorized
payments could trigger some of the distributive concerns that justify pursuit
of objectives other than superior risk avoiding.
1. Varieties of Fraud and Fraud-Prevention Technologies
Consider the first difficulty. Depositary banks are likely best posi-
tioned to protect against forged payee indorsements by virtue of their ca-
pacity to ensure that checks are only deposited into accounts bearing the
payee's name and to monitor the conduct of their customers. Thus, the
current legal rule that allows the party whose signature has been forged to
recover in conversion from the depositary bank makes sense. 95 Moreover,
the relative ability of a drawee bank to recover from the depositary bank on
a warranty theory in such a situation arguably justifies the requirement that
95. See U.C.C. § 3-420(a).
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the drawer recover from the drawee, 96 while the latter proceeds against the
depositary bank.97
But check fraud law recognizes that one cannot conclude that the de-
positary bank systematically occupies the "superior position to avoid the
loss." Exceptions to bank liability for forged indorsements essentially im-
pose on users of the payment system an obligation to take advantage of
low-cost precautions that would reduce check fraud, presumably on the
assumption that in some unique circumstances payment system users have
an advantage over system providers in detecting and deterring fraud. An
employer who fails to monitor employees, 98 a drawer who signs a check
without determining that the payee is actually owed money, 99 and a drawer
who fails to determine the true identity of an impersonator1 00 arguably each
stands in a better position than the depositary bank to detect and deter
fraudulent activity. The argument that the system users, employers in par-
ticular, should bear the fraud costs in these situations as a cost of doing
business' 0 ' entails the belief that employers can bear these risks at lower
costs than depositary banks. If that is the case, then a uniform provision
that places the loss on system providers would generate excess precaution
costs.
The situation becomes more complicated when we turn to forged
drawers' signatures. Here, the law presumptively places the loss on the
drawee bank that pays the check. Upstream banks do not warrant to the
drawee that the drawer's signature is authorized. 102 The drawee bank
would bear no liability if it detected the forgery prior to making payment
on the check, although in practice detection is impractical. The original
explanation for the apparent anomaly in making drawees liable for paying
checks bearing forged drawers' signatures, based on technical capacity to
compare signatures on checks to those on signature cards and embodied in
the chestnut of Price v. Neal,103 retains little persuasive power for most
commentators. 104 Few believe that in a technological age banks will or
96. An issuer of a check is barred from bringing an action in conversion. Id.
97. See U.C.C. § 3-417.
98. Id. § 3-405(b).
99. Id. §§ 3-404(b), 3-406.
100. Id. § 3-404(a).
101. See id. § 3-405 cmt. 1.
102. See id. § 3-417(a)(3) & cmt. 3.
103. (1762) 3 Burr. 1354, 1357, 97 Eng. Rep. 871, 872 (K.B.).
104. See, e.g., Christopher M. Grengs & Edward S. Adams, Contracting Around Finality: Trans-
forming Price v. Nealfrom Dictate to Default, 89 MINN. L. REV. 163, 179 (2004) (rule is "not entirely
without controversy"); A. Brooke Overby, Check Fraud in the Courts After the Revisions to U.C.C.
Articles 3 and 4, 57 ALA. L. REV. 351, 360 (2005) (rule now a "quaint historical relic with little practi-
cal force in modem banking law"); Rogers, supra note 2, at 454.
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should compare signatures on any but the largest or most suspicious checks
with those on customer signature cards. In an age in which counterfeit
checks can be processed as facsimiles of originals, comparisons with signa-
ture cards will likely reveal no difference to the most highly trained eye. 105
But here, the second difficulty is present: the identity of the superior
loss avoider may change depending on the level of technology assumed.
Placing liability on drawees with respect to drawers' signatures does pro-
vide an incentive for banks to develop technologies to detect fraud. If
drawee banks are better positioned than customers or depository banks to
engage in that activity, then the assumed irrelevance of Price v. Neal to
contemporary banking dissipates. It may be true that drawees cannot effi-
ciently review drawer signatures. But signature comparisons are not the
only plausible anti-fraud precaution. For instance, the development of posi-
tive pay systems, in which drawees make available to customers a means to
designate checks that have been authorized for payment prior to the time of
presentment, presumably occurred only because drawee banks could de-
velop and implement such systems at a cost lower than the fraud costs that
they would otherwise bear. If customers bore liability, collective action
problems among a large, diffuse, and difficult to organize population of
bank customers would presumably frustrate any efforts to develop a similar
system. Imposing liability on banks in their status as depositaries might
also interfere with such technological developments, because when banks
act as depositaries they typically bear liability to non-customers whose
indorsements have been forged. Depositary banks would have difficulty
marketing a positive pay system to that population, since the banks are not
in a relationship with the potential beneficiaries and could not easily iden-
tify the members of that population. The result is that even if a class of
actors is not in a superior position to bear losses under the current state of
anti-fraud technology, they might be in a superior position to develop a
different level of technology. Expecting rules that uniformly allocate losses
within and across payment systems under these circumstances is unlikely to
serve the objective of minimizing the total costs of fraud and anti-fraud
precautions.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that some current payment rules involving
unauthorized payments are inconsistent with the objective of loss minimi-
zation. Rules that impose liability on card issuers even when the cardholder
has demonstrably been negligent are unlikely to reduce the total costs of
fraud and anti-fraud precautions. For instance, in the case of a consumer
105. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Foster Bancshares, Inc., 457 F.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 2006);
Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A, 61 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 458, 461 (4th Cir. 2006).
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who allows a third party to lurk behind him and steal a PIN, who responds
to phishing emails that have characteristics indicating their fraudulent na-
ture, or who negligently keeps passwords and usernames in a conspicuous
place, subsequent unauthorized access to the consumer's account that is
made possible by those actions is still considered unauthorized and charge-
able to the financial institution from which the transfer was made. Given
that the card issuer will be unable to distinguish the identity thief s use
from authorized use, and given that the finding of negligence implicitly
suggests that the consumer was in a superior position to avoid the loss, the
decision to protect consumers in these situations necessarily deviates from
the general proposition that parties to payments transactions would desire
to allocate losses in a manner consistent with risk-avoiding capacity.
2. Consumer Protection and Diverse Payment System Rules
The case for diversity in payments system rules can be based on two
different grounds: optimal risk allocation and non-efficiency goals. Part
III.A noted the possibility that uniform rules are inappropriate because
different payment systems are intended to serve different objectives. Unau-
thorized use rules that ignore user negligence arguably reflect a decision to
subordinate efficiency in payments law to some other goal. The liability
limits in payment systems for credit and debit cards are touted as consumer
protection schemes rather than as efforts to place losses on the party in the
best position to avoid them. Thus, it makes sense to ask whether payment
system rules should be uniform across users, or whether they should distin-
guish between consumer and non-consumer users. This could be done ei-
ther on a case-by-case basis, so that the same payment system is subject to
different rules depending whether the user in the particular case is a con-
sumer or a non-consumer. Or we could have different rules apply to differ-
ent systems, depending on whether the system tends to be dominated by
consumers or non-consumers. We argue below that consumer protection
does not justify deviation from the objective of optimal risk allocation.
Thus, notwithstanding our general proposition that variety among payment
systems is useful, the consumer area may be one in which there is insuffi-
cient uniformity with non-consumer payments law. It is plausible, however,
that behavioral characteristics of consumers would justify legal restrictions
that augment payments law, such as disclosure requirements and limita-
tions on clauses. Doing so, however, is best justified not because "con-
sumer protection" warrants deviation from the standard objectives of
payments law. Rather, such deviations are justified, if at all, because sys-
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tematic vulnerability of consumers to certain conduct means that they do
not occupy the best position to avoid losses.
Note first that, to the extent that payment systems seek to distinguish
between consumers and non-consumers, current law creates an anomaly. If
the objective is to create a regime of consumer protection that subordinates
efficiency concerns, then it is unclear why that objective is not pervasive
across payment systems. Checks that are drawn on consumer accounts are
subject to the same loss-allocation rules as checks drawn on business ac-
counts. Those rules reduce or eliminate bank liability for fraud where the
consumer has been negligent and the bank has not. If the bank that a con-
sumer claims took or paid a check bearing a forgery can demonstrate that
the consumer failed to exercise ordinary care in a manner that substantially
contributed to the making of the forgery, the bank bears no liability. If the
bank itself failed to exercise ordinary care in taking or paying the check,
the loss is allocated according to principles of comparative negligence be-
tween the bank asserting the preclusion and the person precluded.106 These
rules, of course, stand in contrast to the federal rules that render consumer
negligence irrelevant in the case of electronic fund transfers. The anomaly
cannot be explained by administrative difficulty in distinguishing between
consumer and non-consumer checks in an age where simple MICR coding
could identify the nature of each checking account. If consumer protection
is the supervening principle for payment systems involving consumer cards
or access devices, it is unclear why efficiency principles that place losses
on the party in the best position to avoid them should prevail over the same
concerns in check systems.
In evaluating the propriety of distinguishing between consumers and
non-consumers, we differentiate between two types of pro-consumer regu-
lations. One set purports to compensate for psychological biases and heu-
ristics from which consumers are likely to suffer and that are not readily
susceptible to market corrections. Under these circumstances, government
regulation may be appropriate to avoid exploitation of consumers who
might otherwise accept terms that do not reflect either an actual bargain or
a virtual bargain of the type that would emerge in the presence of market
competition. 107 There is significant and growing literature about measures
used by credit card issuers that arguably take advantage of the behavioral
limitations of consumer decision making in a manner that might justify
legal intervention. Consumers may, for instance, underestimate the likeli-
106. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-404(d), 3-405(b), 3-406(a)-(b).
107. See Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wisc. L. REv. 679,
716-21.
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hood of incurring late fees, defaulting on credit obligations, or suffering
adverse consequences by making only minimal payments on outstanding
credit card balances. Credit card issuers may respond by imposing interest
rate increases or late fees that exceed the increased risk associated with
default or late payment. Alternatively, consumers may ignore non-salient
clauses in credit card contracts in ways that make them susceptible to su-
pracompetitive prices. For instance, while consumers likely pay attention to
interest rates on credit cards, so that different credit card companies com-
pete on that variable in ways that render government regulation superflu-
ous, fees for services such as currency conversion may be less salient at the
time the cardholder obtains a credit or debit card or even at the time the
cardholder uses the card. As a result, card issuers may be able to charge
noncompetitive fees for the conversion service. 108
There is a useful and robust debate about whether these practices ex-
ploit informational asymmetries, high switching costs, or hyperbolic dis-
counting and other cognitive errors by consumers, or whether they are cost-
justified responses to signals of higher default risk than was reflected in the
original terms on which the credit card was issued. 109 There is also signifi-
cant debate about whether consumer vulnerability to these practices is per-
sistent, or can be reduced by additional disclosure and other debiasing
techniques. 110 The more consumers appear vulnerable to these practices
without the protection of traditional competitive restraints on issuers, the
stronger the argument for special protection that may deviate from the
norm for payment systems. Under these circumstances, government regula-
tion-either in the form of disclosure to correct consumer misinformation,
or to substantively regulate services that cannot readily be made salient to
consumers-may be appropriate in the name of consumer protection. The
recent concerns for consumer vulnerability, however, do not appear to in-
volve rules that vary across payment systems, or that allocate the payment
risks with which we are primarily concerned. That is, with one possible
exception that we discuss below, rules that allocate risks of unauthorized
payment, irreversibility, and payment error are not implicated by the cogni-
108. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Erin Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
157, 161-62 (2006).
109. See generally RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD 4-5 (2006); Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and
Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 33, 48-49 (2006); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98
Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1401 (2004); Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment Intermediaries, 82
TEX. L. REV. 681, 692-93 (2004).
110. For analysis of both anti-consumer measures that may survive in a competitive equilibrium
and measures that may dissipate over time due to competition, see Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson,




tive errors that arguably infect decision making about interest rates and
incurring debt. They deal with issues of consumer behavior with respect to
known risks, rather than excusable ignorance of unknown risks.
The line between the known and unknown risks certainly is not clear-
cut. One might justifiably ask whether consumers who make their PINs
easily accessible to others are negligently ignoring salient risks, or are suf-
fering from a bias of underestimating the likelihood that a risk will materi-
alize. Thus, one might claim that the negligence concept is too flexible to
permit easy application in the case of consumers, because it cannot ac-
commodate information asymmetries between unsophisticated consumers
who are unaware of the risks they create through careless behavior and
financial institutions that, as repeat players, have both data and the capacity
to inform their customers of the dangers of carelessness. At the time the
EFTA was enacted, in 1978, concepts such as PIN numbers and electronic
fund transfers at ATMs were relatively novel. In those relatively innocent,
pre-identity theft days, it is plausible that many consumers would have
been unaware of the risks related to acts such as writing PINs on cards or
otherwise making means of account access available to third parties. A
broad immunity for negligence avoided ad hoc inquiries into the level of
care of consumers who were easily fooled into surrendering information to
wrongdoers, but who, given the novel state of technology and low level of
exposure to risk or information about risk, were unlikely to be negligent in
a legal sense.111 Similarly, at the time that spain emails began, consumers
might have been forgiven for responding to fraudulent phishing emails that
invited bank customers to change their personal banking information online
or to assist in recovering millions from the treasury of a developing na-
tion's former dictator. Avoiding negligence inquiries under those circum-
stances might be thought of as a means of reducing error costs that would
have inevitably arisen as courts and juries sought to determine reasonable
behavior under changing circumstances. Strict liability for more informed,
repeat player card issuers would have induced them to convey information
to consumers concerning appropriate precautions.
The problem with such justifications for different consumer rules is
that they rely on a level of information that is likely to evolve over time.
While consumers may have been relatively unaware of the risks of failing
to protect PINs during the first years of popular ATM withdrawals and
debit cards, it is the rare consumer today who is not bombarded with in-
formation concerning identity theft and the need to protect financial infor-
111. See, for instance, the early cases on ATM misuse, such as Feldman v. Citibank, 443 N.Y.S.2d
43, 45 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981), and Ognibene v. Citibank, 446 N.Y.S.2d 845,848 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981).
[Vol 83:2
UNIFORMITY AND DIVERSITY IN PAYMENT SYSTEMS
mation. Those who continue to fall prey to email scams or phishing expedi-
tions generate less sympathy than disbelief at their gullibility.,1 2 The ex-
planation that liability is necessary to induce banks to caution consumers
seems outdated at a time when the number of electronic transactions ex-
ceeds the number of personal checks, and when consumers increasingly
utilize electronic fund transfers from multiple sources-payroll cards, debit
cards, computerized payments-that require the use of a PIN or other ac-
cess device that the consumer understands can permit unauthorized access
if misused. To the extent that liability induces banks to provide information
to consumers, bank liability for non-negligent unauthorized transfers could
be sufficient to encourage an optimal flow of information. Continued ex-
cuse of behavior that today appears negligent, therefore, may be more a
function of path dependence and the stickiness of regulation than of con-
sideration of the proper scope of consumer protection under current cir-
cumstances. If that is the case, then more uniformity than current law
provides might be appropriate, but it would be uniformity that avoids cur-
rent distinctions between consumers and non-consumers.
Moreover, the claim that disregarding consumer negligence serves the
objective of consumer protection is itself contestable. We do not propose
here to rehearse the arguments for or against fulfilling these objectives
through the payment system rather than through broad-based subsidies in
the tax system. We do, however, note one overlooked phenomenon of the
effort to protect consumers by immunizing negligence. Ignoring consumer
negligence does serve the interests of negligent consumers. Assuming that
they were well positioned to avoid losses, shifting those losses elsewhere
entails excess costs that likewise must be borne elsewhere. In a competitive
environment, one would anticipate that financial institutions will seek to
shift the costs of consumer negligence that banks bear as a consequence of
consumer immunity back into the consumer banking system through higher
fees and charges. As a consequence, non-negligent consumers will bear at
least some of the costs related to consumer negligence. It is plausible that
non-negligent consumers would prefer to bear lower fees and charges that
would flow from optimal risk allocation to the higher amounts that they
bear in order to subsidize the negligence costs related to other consumers.
If that is the case, it is a peculiar conception of "consumer protection" that
requires the subsidy within the consumer class. If we believed that con-
sumer negligence correlated well with subclasses of consumers that sys-
tematically needed protection, such as the poor or the elderly, then we
112. See, e.g., Jimena v. UBS AG Bank, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-00367, 2007 WL 1687045, at *1 (E.D.
Cal. June 8, 2007); Valley Bank v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 188 (Mont. 2006).
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might justify the subsidy on distributive grounds. The poor, however, are
more likely to fall within the range category of the "unbanked" than within
the category of credit and debit card users.1 13 In short, absent information
about who benefits from immunity for negligence, it is not clear that con-
sumer protection justifies the deviation from the objective of placing losses
on the party in the best position to avoid them.
C. Diversity by Payments User
The issue of uniformity becomes more complicated when we ask
whether consumers and non-consumers should be distinguished in payment
systems that are used by both groups. For instance, one might insist that
consumers are poorly served by the Article 3 and Article 4 rules that apply
to any check. That claim may be rooted in either of two explanations. First,
one might contend that consumers have been excluded from the drafting
process that promulgated the rules, and were not represented by any group
that was involved. Second, one might contend that consumers have differ-
ent risk avoiding capacities than non-consumers. Neither of these explana-
tions seems plausible in the context of check rules, however. With respect
to the first, it is certainly the case that the original Article 3 and Article 4
rules were drafted primarily by bank interests, with some input from busi-
ness interests.' 14 Consumer groups, even the few that may have existed
during the period when Articles 3 and 4 were originally drafted, appear not
to have been at the table. Consumer groups were more apparent in the 1990
revision of Article 3 and amendments to Article 4, and in the 2003 pro-
posed amendments, though their victories appear to have been slim. 115
Most of the concerns, however, appear to lie with the failure of the pro-
posed revisions to address issues of interest to consumers not currently
addressed by the U.C.C., such as late fees or the unbanked, rather than with
the risk allocations that were provided. 116
With respect to the second claim, it is plausible that the law as applied
currently does distinguish between consumer and non-consumer users,
notwithstanding formal uniformity in the applicable standard. The formal
rules may obfuscate some distinctions that implicitly reflect the occasional
113. See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004).
114. See, e.g., Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Proc-
ess: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993); Edward Rubin,
Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision ofArticles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REv. 551, 552-57 (1991).
115. See, e.g., Gail K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Consumer Perspective, 42 ALA. L. REV. 679, 682 (1991); Patchel, supra note 114, at 86.
116. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The Revision of U.C.C. Articles Three and Four: A Process Which
Excluded Consumer Protection Requires Federal Action, 43 MERCER L. REv. 827 (1992).
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differing capacities of consumers and non-consumers to avoid risks. The
formal rules make no distinction, for instance, in the standard of care to be
used by a consumer or non-consumer drawer. However, some distinction
may exist in the application of these formal rules, because what satisfies the
standard for a member of one group may vary from what satisfies the stan-
dard for another group. For instance, section 3-406 precludes a drawer who
fails to exercise ordinary care from asserting a forgery. But what consti-
tutes ordinary care for a consumer may differ from what qualifies for a
non-consumer. Employers may be expected to create systems that preclude
any one employee from having too much control over the processing of
incoming or outgoing checks. Consumers are not expected to add multiple
layers of precaution, although they may be expected to ensure that room-
mates or other persons who are not co-owners do not have easy access to
their accounts. 117 The use of flexible standards such as "ordinary care,"
therefore, illustrates a capacity to adjust liability to reflect superior risk
avoiding ability. Thus, a formally "uniform" standard implicitly recognizes
that it may be appropriate to impose liability on non-consumers where
similar conduct by consumers would allow them to shift the liability to a
bank.
In other circumstances, however, the law with respect to checks cre-
ates no distinction between consumers and non-consumers. For instance,
both groups are obligated to review items reflected on statements with rea-
sonable promptness after statements are made available and to notify the
drawee of any discrepancies. 118 Presumably, relative to the drawee bank,
members of each of these groups are in a superior position to detect forger-
ies and alterations on checks drawn from their accounts. As a result, from a
risk allocation perspective, there is little basis for distinguishing between
them for purposes of the notice requirement.
Finally, one might advocate bank liability over consumer liability on
an insurance rationale. Return to the proposition mentioned above that
losses that flow from unauthorized payments, and that are not placed di-
rectly on the consumer, must be borne somewhere within the payment sys-
tem, and that consumers are ultimately likely to bear those losses through
the fees they pay for payment services. Financial institutions that bear these
costs in the first instance are likely to seek to pass on as many of the costs
as possible to customers. The effect is that all consumers will pay for the
errors made by any consumer that leads to an unauthorized debit or credit
117. See, e.g., Jurcisin v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 2006-10-078, 2007 WL 1731419, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 18, 2007).
118. U.C.C. § 4-406(c) (2005).
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card charge. At least where losses do not result from negligence, this may
be an appropriate strategy. It effectively provides each consumer with an
insurance policy against conduct that leads to catastrophic loss (or less)
from one's credit card or bank account. The small amount by which finan-
cial institutions that initially bear the losses will raise fees to any consumer
may constitute a premium for providing that insurance. In addition, as we
have noted above, financial institutions and card networks are likely in
better positions to develop and implement anti-fraud technologies than
consumers, so that inducing the former to seize their advantage will likely
reduce the total costs related to unauthorized payments and precautionary
behavior.
As we implied above, however, the "insurance" justification suggests
that the talisman of "consumer protection" should not be taken to absolve
all consumers from all losses in all circumstances. Rather, it should be
taken as a basis for determining what kind of consumer behavior should be
considered. Presumably, consumers as a class would prefer to insure
against risks to which all consumers are relatively equally exposed. If con-
sumers as a class are, with low variance among class members, exposed to
risks of theft and forgery, then presumably consumers as a class would be
better off with class-based insurance supported through bank fees. But if
most members of the consumer class would take a level of care with re-
spect to the risk of unauthorized payments, then it is less clear that the ma-
jority would want to subsidize those whose negligence increases losses
from unauthorized payments for which all consumers must pay insurance
premiums. That is, consumers as a class may prefer not to insure against a
level of inadvertence that would be exhibited only by a few.
Indeed, even outside the consumer area, the consequences of system
user negligence seem peculiarly non-uniform. In the area of business
checks, as in the area of consumer checks, a drawee or depositary bank will
be able to shift all or part of the loss from fraud on the business system
user, depending on the bank's own exercise of ordinary care. Again, com-
parative negligence principles will apply where both parties failed to exer-
cise ordinary care.
Compare that situation to the result when parties to wholesale wire
transfers fail to exercise ordinary care. A bank that executes a payment
order will be able to charge its customer the amount of the order, even if
the order was unauthorized, if the bank and the customer agreed that the
authenticity of payment orders would be verified pursuant to a security
procedure and the bank accepted the payment order in good faith and in
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compliance with the security procedure. 19 The underlying assumption is
that if an unauthorized person was able to circumvent the approved security
procedure, the customer was presumptively negligent in failing to supervise
an employee or in publicizing the information necessary to transmit the
payment order to the bank. Thus far, the result is consistent with what
would happen if a negligent customer contributed to the making of a for-
gery on a check.
But what if the bank is also negligent with respect to execution of an
unauthorized payment order? That negligence would presumably consist of
failure to follow an agreed-to security procedure. For instance, a bank
might neglect to employ a required callback procedure or accept a payment
order that was sent unencrypted in violation of the procedure. A bank that
fails to comply with the terms of the security procedure will be able to shift
any part of the loss from executing an unauthorized payment order back to
the customer, notwithstanding that the customer was itself negligent. In
short, contributory negligence, rather than comparative negligence, princi-
ples apply. This result obtains notwithstanding that Article 4A was drafted
at approximately the same time that comparative negligence principles
were incorporated into the revisions to Article 3. Given that the primary
justification for the latter was that comparative negligence represented the
most recent jurisprudence with respect to negligence principles, the diver-
gent treatments of bank negligence in Articles 3 and 4A seems even more
difficult to justify.
Assuming that parties, especially commercial parties, would prefer de-
fault rules that minimize the total costs of fraud and anti-fraud precautions,
there seems little reason to believe that the objective would be achieved
through comparative negligence principles for checks and contributory
negligence for wire transfers. There is some appropriate debate about
which of these systems best induces care by parties optimally positioned to
take it.120 But there is no reason to believe that resolution of that debate
will be different for different payment systems. This conclusion is consis-
tent with our argument for diversity in payments system rules. The argu-
ment is that different parties, or the same parties in different transactions,
might prefer to allocate some payment risks differently across payment
systems. The risk of an unauthorized use simply is a risk that is optimally
allocated between banks and their customers the same way, regardless of
whether payment is made by check or wire transfer.
119. U.C.C. §4A-202.
120. See Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Pay-
ments, 66 TEX. L. REV. 63, 75 (1987); Mann, supra note 4, at 638-39; Rogers, supra note 2, at 467-72.
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D. Reversibility of Payment
1. Minimizing the Costs of Defective Transactions
The rules related to reversibility of payments come into play primarily
when a user of a payments system is disappointed with a good or service
that the user has purchased. Thus, the risk involved is of product quality, a
risk that we refer to as a defective transaction. Defective transactions are
socially wasteful because they involve the receipt of a good or service that
has a lower value than the purchaser agreed to pay and require that some
party seek redress from the supplier. These costs would be minimized if the
loss that resulted from the transaction was incurred either by the party who
could best prevent the defective transaction from occurring in the first in-
stance or who could most easily obtain redress after its detection. The law
of reversibility can therefore serve these social purposes if it induces the
party who occupies that position to take advantage of his or her situation.
If, for instance, payment system providers are well positioned, relative to
payment system users or to merchants to detect and deter defective transac-
tions, then it makes sense to have a broad rule of reversibility between the
buyer and merchant, thus inducing the payment system provider to monitor
against defective transactions and to obtain redress when they occur. It is
plausible, however, that different parties will occupy the relevant positions.
That is, the user of a payment system may be in a superior position to avoid
the defective transaction from occurring in the first instance by carefully
selecting sellers or by inspecting goods prior to payment. But in an econ-
omy in which consumers cannot easily inspect goods until after payment
(either because the goods are packaged or are delivered subsequent to pay-
ment), it is not always clear that the payment system user is well positioned
to avoid the transaction. And once a defective transaction has occurred, it
may be that the payment system provider is in the superior position to seek
redress. In the face of uncertainty about who is in the best position to
minimize the costs of defective transactions, a menu system that allows
different parties to select different risk allocation mechanisms may permit
the best matching of risks and transactional preferences. Alternatively, a
greater degree of uniformity may be desirable if one party to payment
transactions systematically occupies the best position to minimize the costs
related to defective transactions.
From this perspective, current law seems confused. Initially, purchas-
ers would appear generally to stand in a superior position, relative to their
banks, to select merchants who are likely to complete a contract with a
conforming good or service or who are likely to provide redress should a
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transaction go awry, assuming that consumers have access to reputational
information concerning their sellers. Thus, at least with respect to sellers
who are geographically proximate to their buyers, it seems likely that buy-
ers will be well positioned to avoid defective transactions or to obtain re-
dress when such a transaction materializes. Nevertheless, it is plausible that
buyers, especially consumers, may also purchase certain goods so infre-
quently, or from sellers about whom reputational information is so thin,
that the buyers have little reliable information about their sellers. This may
be particularly the case with respect to online transactions with anonymous
sellers, notwithstanding the availability of feedback about sellers from
other buyers, 121 or with respect to sellers who are geographically distant
from their buyers. Those same sellers, however, may be repeat players with
respect to payment system providers or payment networks to which those
providers belong. In these circumstances, it is possible that the payment
system provider could have information or access to information that
would either deter defective transactions or that would facilitate recovery
on behalf of the buyer. In these latter cases, legal rules that place the risk of
defective transactions on the payment system, by permitting the user to
reverse payment and thus requiring the provider to recover from the mer-
chant, would appear justifiable.
From this perspective, at least part of current law arguably gets the le-
gal rule backwards. The Truth in Lending Act permits consumers who have
charged purchases to assert against their card issuer any defense that they
could have asserted against the merchant. 122 The practical effect of the
provision is to permit issuing banks to charge back against the merchant
any amount previously paid in respect of the contested charge. The mer-
chant then bears the burden of demonstrating that it provided a conforming
performance. The consumer buyer has no right to assert claims against the
issuer bank, however, if the charge has been incurred in a transaction that
takes place outside the consumer's state of residence and more than 100
miles from the consumer's home. Thus, the consumer has greater rights to
reverse payment with respect to geographically proximate transactions than
long-distance ones. Putting to the side the issue of where a telephonic or
online transaction "occurred," this seems inconsistent with the notion that
consumers are likely to have superior information and capacity to obtain
redress with respect to merchants who are geographically proximate, since
121. For a discussion of the limitations of online feedback mechanisms, see Clayton P. Gillette,
Reputation and Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce, 62 LA. L. REV. 1165 (2002).




consumers are likely to be repeat players with respect to those merchants.
Since, in an age where credit card solicitations are nationwide, credit card-
holders will not necessarily possess a card issued by a bank located in the
same area as the cardholder's residence, there seems to be less reason to
believe that the card issuer will have significant information about the mer-
chant.
It is possible, of course, that a card network would be able to obtain
information about merchants who have been the subject of frequent
chargebacks and to monitor their performance, presumably at lower cost
than consumers who face higher informational barriers to monitoring. A
threat to terminate the merchant from the network could serve as a signifi-
cant deterrent to merchant misbehavior. On that understanding, issuer
banks may stand in a relatively good position to detect and deter defective
transactions. But, given that such information will be largely quantitative
and may not reflect the nuances of situations, such as the nature of the de-
fect and efforts to resolve the dispute, and may not include information
about disputes that were informally resolved, the banks' informational ad-
vantage may be most salient in long-distance transactions, rather than those
that occur in environments where consumers are likely to be familiar with
merchants' reputations. Thus, current credit card law effectively gives con-
sumers the right to assert defenses against card issuers in the only situation
where consumers are likely to have better information about merchants
than card issuers, and to deny the right in the very cases in which card issu-
ers might be better positioned to avoid the risk of defective transactions
than the consumers themselves.
The analysis to this point has assumed that the alleged defective trans-
action has occurred because of merchant misbehavior and asked who, as
between the buyer and the payment system provider, can best detect and
deter that misbehavior. There is, however, an alternative explanation for the
allegedly defective transaction. It may be that the transaction conforms to
the terms of the transaction, but that the consumer seeks to reverse payment
either out of regret, a misperception of the good's characteristics, or a cal-
culated effort to exploit sellers. 123 Consumers, for instance, may be serial
"returners" of goods that they have used for a limited period of time, a
phenomenon that explains why sellers of large screen televisions allegedly
suspend their money-back guarantees during Super Bowl season. 124 Alter-
123. See, e.g., R.A. Fullerton & G. Punj, Repercussions of Promoting an Ideology of Consumption:
Consumer Misbehavior, 57 J. Bus. REs. 1239, 1240-41 (2004).
124. See, e.g., Sandra Block, Stores Toughen Return Policies, USA TODAY, Dec. 27, 2005, at 3B.
Are post-Super Bowl returns really a problem? We don't know of any statistical study of the phenome-
non. But some anecdotal evidence indicates that it is a prominent element of the general phenomenon of
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natively, consumers may seek to return goods as defective when consumers
are responsible for the defective nature of the good. 125 We group those
motivations as "consumer misconduct." If we believed that most allegedly
defective transactions were attributable to consumer misconduct, then there
would be little reason to facilitate reversibility of payments. Where con-
sumer misconduct or misuse is observable to sellers, but not verifiable,
merchants may justifiably refuse to accept returns. Payment system provid-
ers, however, may be in a relatively good position to detect consumer mis-
behavior, insofar as they can discern patterns of serial returns or protests by
the same consumer who deals with different merchants. 126
Rules with respect to reversibility, therefore, might be adjusted to take
better advantage of the relative capacities of merchants, buyers, and pay-
ment system providers. But if informational advantage is what justifies
reversibility in any case, it is even less clear that the differences in reversi-
bility rules make sense. The credit card rules bear no relationship to rules in
other systems. The law with respect to debit cards contains no provision for
reversing a transaction, regardless of whether the transaction is processed
in a manner that makes debits from the cardholder's account essentially
simultaneous with the transaction, or whether the transaction is processed
through a slower network with signatures and paper receipts akin to credit
consumer misbehavior. A recent blogger, commenting on the elimination of a very liberal return policy
at Costco, wrote:
I actually work for Costco in Bridgewater, NJ and I have to say that we all saw this policy
change coming, we've been saying it for years that it has to change. The problem with this
policy is that, while it is used for it's intent of standing behind merchandise by some, it is also
highly abused by many others. In my store, I've worked in the refunds department, so I've
seen this first hand. We have one particular member (We all know him by name, but I won't
post it here out of courtsey [sic]) who will buy TVs, cameras, Ipods, etc and return them
every time a new model comes out. Now, aside from use, there[']s nothing wrong with the
items he returns, he just wants newer models. He's not the only one to do this, there are more.
Just this past summer, we accepted a refund on a laptop from a different member. The laptop
was 4 days shy of 6 months old (the limit on laptop refunds). When we looked further into
this account, it turns out that, in the span of 2 years, this particular member purchased 13
laptops and desktops and returned all but 2 of them. This is clear abuse of a generous policy.
We see similar returns seasonally. In the summer, we have an influx of shovels and snow
throwers returned. In the winter/fall, we get back patio furniture, grills, lawn mowers, etc. We
also get a mad rush of Post-Super Bowl TV refunds. People use our policy as a way to "rent"
items, not as a promise to stand behind faulty merchandise. It's a shame that some people feel
no guilt in doing this. Not only do they ruin the policy for others, but in doing so, they are
also driving up costs of all other merchandise.
Posting of A Costco Employee (Mar. 19, 2007, 12:48 EST) to Blueprint for Financial Prosperity,
http://www.bargaineering.com/articles/ (Mar. 1, 2007).
125. See, e.g., Izraelewitz v. Mfr. Hanover Trust Co., 465 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487-89 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1983); Bartus v. Riccardi, 4 UCC Rptr. Serv. 845, 846 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967).
126. We agree with Ronald Mann that it would be useful to know the frequency with which card-
holder claims prevail. See Mann, supra note 4, at 660. But rates with which the claims prevail may not
be the same as rates with which merchants or consumers misbehave. As Mann indicates, merchants may
agree to give credits to avoid further difficulties with credit card issuers. Consumers may abandon valid
claims because they cannot afford to litigate them.
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card transaction processing. Check transactions permit the drawer to coun-
termand the order by issuing a stop payment order. The drawee bank is
obligated to comply with the stop payment order, as long as it receives the
order in time to act on it before it makes final payment of the item. While
electronic presentment and remote deposit capture reduce the relevant time
period, it is still plausible that the period between check delivery and pre-
sentment will be sufficient to allow consumers to inspect the quality of
goods and act on dissatisfaction. Where a stop payment order is otherwise
effective, no investigation into the alleged defects in the underlying trans-
action is either necessary or appropriate. Moreover, a drawee bank that
improperly makes payment over a stop payment order is subrogated to the
rights of the payee or a holder in due course of the item. As a result, a
drawer who issues a timely stop payment order in a transaction that is not,
in fact, defective will be able to require the payee to seek payment for the
goods or services provided. But a bank that pays over the stop payment
order will be able enforce the check against the drawer.
These rules may make some sense from the perspective of protecting
the finality of transactions. Credit card transactions are arguably not final
until the issuer has billed the card holder and received payment with re-
spect to the transaction. Thus, allowing the transaction to be undone does
not require unwinding a completed transaction. The same cannot be said
about debit cards, at least in theory, since withdrawal of the payment
amount from the card holder's account is expected to be simultaneous with
the transaction. In practice, there may be substantial departures from the-
ory, especially with respect to signature-based cards that are processed
along paper networks. In those cases, prompt efforts at reversing the trans-
action could provide notice to the card issuer prior to the time that the card
holder's account is debited. But, as in the case of the expanded definition of
electronic fund transfers to cover all debit card transactions,1 27 there may
be some value to treating all debit card transactions identically to avoid
consumer confusion. Finally, check rules tie reversibility explicitly to the
finality of the transaction. Again, a stop payment order is effective as long
as it is received prior to the point that is basically equivalent to final pay-
ment. 12 8
But why should finality matter? Certainly there are costs to unwinding
a completed transaction. Expectations have been settled; merchants may
have restocked inventory or assumed additional obligations based on com-
pleted transactions. But in a mass market economy, we question whether
127. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
128. See U.C.C. §§ 4-215, 4-303 (2005).
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the number of transactions that need to be undone will dramatically affect
merchant behavior, and the costs of reversing transactions must be weighed
against the losses that can be avoided if defective transactions are deterred
by reversibility or if merchants are better positioned to minimize the costs
related to defective transactions, for instance by reselling the goods. More-
over, the merchant who accepts a credit card in payment is unlikely to fore-
stall restocking inventory or forgo alternative transactions out of concern
that a "completed" credit transaction will be undone. In short, finality
seems to be less of a factor relevant to the proper allocation of defective
transactions costs than the issue of superior loss avoiding or loss bearing.
It is less clear that the analysis we provided above with respect to
minimizing defective transactions applies with equal force outside the
credit card setting. The closest case would appear to be the debit card, since
the same or similar networks that provide credit card processing exist in the
debit card environment. Thus, the ability to monitor buyers and merchants,
to reverse credits and debits, and to deter defective transactions in the first
instance favors similar degrees of reversibility, assuming that the costs of
undoing the "finalized" transaction are not too high.
The case of checks is more difficult. Drawee banks may be able to
monitor customers who issue high levels of stop payment orders, and who
therefore appear to be engaged in consumer misconduct. But given that
drawee banks face no liability for dishonoring checks subject to a stop
payment order, 129 they have little incentive to take advantage of this posi-
tion. Moreover, drawee banks will have little information about payee mer-
chants similar to the information that might be available through their
membership in card networks. While they may be able to obtain informa-
tion about merchant payees where those merchants are also members of the
card networks to which the drawee bank belongs, the drawee will not have
an easy mechanism for reversing credits given through the check collection
system. Thus, initially we might think that there is little reason to provide
reversibility in the check context similar to the capacity of credit card users
to assert against card issuers the defenses that the card holders have against
merchants.
But that conclusion may be too facile, for two reasons. First, there is
nothing technologically impossible about allowing credits due to checks to
be reversed after final payment. Indeed, that is exactly what we would ex-
pect to happen in the event of payment of a check in violation of a transfer
warranty or presentment warranty. Second, in the event that the merchant
129. See id. § 3-408.
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payee is also a member of a card network to which the drawee bank be-
longs, we could imagine a process by which the bank could undo a check
payment by reversing credits given through the credit card system. There is
no a priori reason to seal each payment system hermetically from every
other system. The issue again is whether payment system providers stand in
such a superior position to deter and resolve defective transactions that we
would want to place on them the legal obligation to take advantage of that
position. If so, then more uniformity in rules that place the burden on pay-
ment system providers would be appropriate; if not, then not. That is an
empirical issue that we cannot decide. But we believe that it is a more rele-
vant factor in the reversibility debate than the traditional appeal to finality.
2. Billing Errors and Reversibility
Current law on defenses against card issuers makes even less sense
when considered with rules on billing errors. Assume that a cardholder
does not receive goods prepaid with a credit card and pays the related
charge in full, perhaps because the time for delivery has not yet expired.
Several months later, after expiration of the time for delivery, the card-
holder seeks to set off the amount of the charge with respect to the undeliv-
ered goods against subsequent charges on the cardholder's card. One might
think the cardholder is precluded from shifting the burden of redress to the
card issuer. The provision that allows the cardholder to assert defenses
arising from the underlying transaction against the card issuer applies only
to the extent of "credit outstanding with respect to such transaction" when
the cardholder gives notice of the defective transaction to the card issuer. 130
This provision itself may not make sense from the perspective of superior
risk bearing, since if the card issuer does occupy the best position to seek
redress or to deter the initial misconduct, that position does not appear to be
altered by the receipt of payment with respect to the transaction. Neverthe-
less, the law seems clear on the point. But a different result is reached if the
case is treated as one of non-delivery rather than as a defective transaction.
In that case, inclusion of the charge is considered a billing error. 131 With
respect to billing errors, a cardholder who gives notice to the card issuer
within sixty days after transmission of the statement that references the
transaction will not be responsible for ultimate payment of the disputed
sum, and is presumably entitled to a credit from the card issuer if that pay-
ment has already been made. 132
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1666i(b) (2000).
131. Id. § 1666(b)(3).
132. Id. § 1666(a).
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The inconsistency in treatment is exacerbated by judicial decisions
that have also negated the consequences for consumers of failure to comply
with the sixty-day requirement for giving notice to the card issuer. Courts
have held that a cardholder retains defenses to payment against the issuer
even when the consumer fails to give timely notice in accordance with 15
U.S.C. § 1666(a). 133 Thus, the cardholder's failure to notify the issuer does
not deprive it of the right to have its account credited in the amount of the
related charge. From the perspective of efficient precaution-taking, this gets
the wrong result. The card issuer is in an inferior position to take cost-
justified precautions against the initial use of the credit card to an untrust-
worthy merchant. Even if one were to argue that the card issuer could have
deterred the initial transaction by monitoring poorly performing merchants,
the calculus of precaution costs change when the cardholder receives its
credit card bill. At that point the cardholder can detect a charge with re-
spect to undelivered goods at less cost than the issuer must invest to dis-
cover the seller's noncompliance. The cardholder simply needs to read his
or her statement and inform the issuer. Once informed, any asymmetry in
information between the issuer and cardholder with respect to authorization
is eliminated. The Truth in Lending Act's "billing error" rule, by giving the
cardholder sixty days in which to give notice to the issuer, saves the card-
holder what might otherwise be burdensome costs of discovering improper
charges immediately. But if that burden is sufficiently reduced by the grant
of a sixty-day discovery period, then a rule that allows a cardholder to as-
sert defenses to payment based on non-delivery, notwithstanding the failure
to give the issuer notice, shifts non-recoverable losses away from the card-
holder who occupies a superior position to detect the loss.
There may be cases in which the sixty-day period is insufficient to
trigger cardholder action. Assume, for instance, that the cardholder orders
goods that must be prepaid, but that will reasonably take more than sixty
days to manufacture and send to the cardholder. The prepayment require-
ment means that the charge will show up on the cardholder's statement
immediately. The manufacturing requirement means that the cardholder
will not know of the non-delivery until a period more than sixty days after
receiving the statement that contains the related charge. In such a case,
there is little reason to believe that the cardholder was better positioned to
detect nonperformance or to seek redress. Indeed, if the subsequent non-
133. See, e.g., Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Mincks, 135 S.W.3d 545, 558 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); see also
Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Owens, 951 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that plaintiff com-
plied with sixty-day limit and defendant failed to provide an appropriate written explanation as to why
it refused to refund the erroneous charges).
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delivery is precipitated by the seller's actual or impending failure, the card
issuer is likely in a superior position to detect the loss, because the com-
plaining cardholder is unlikely to have been the only one victimized by
non-delivery. Nevertheless, the rule is not written in a manner that restricts
the shift in liability to cases that fit those circumstances.
E. Preclusion Rules as Default Terms
The case for diversity in payment systems rules has an implication for
the alterability of these rules. Parties to transactions might prefer to allocate
risks in a manner that is not reflected in any of the state-supplied payment
rules that could apply to their transaction, either because the level of risk
aversion varies from that assumed by the state-supplied rule or because the
details of their transaction idiosyncratically cause a party not typically well
positioned to avoid risks to be able to do so. The argument that payment
rules should be considered as means of risk management thus also suggests
that the provisions should be default rules. 134
Although most of payments law consists of default rules, the extent to
which its specific rules are alterable by contract differs across payment
systems. Article 4, 4A and 5's respective general provisions governing
alteration, for instance, are more or less permissive. With few exceptions,
they allow parties to vary their provisions, subject to requirements of good
faith and reasonable care. 135 Even standards of good faith or ordinary care
can be supplied by agreement, if not "manifestly unreasonable." 136
The alterability of specific rules governing claims of payment system
users against payment providers, however, differs between checks and
wholesale wire transfers. For checks, 4-406(f) places a one-year outer limit
from the date a bank statement is made available to the customer in which
134. The distinction between default and mandatory payment rules is not absolute. The difference
is one of degree only. Payments rules are applicable to contracts calling for particular forms of pay-
ment. As often noted, in a sense all rules governing contracts are default terms because parties can
avoid the application of any rule to their agreement at greater or less cost. If an explicit and clear state-
ment is needed to opt out of a rule, the parties' agreement can include the required statement. A choice
of law clause can select a jurisdiction's law that enforces terms provided by the agreement. In the limit,
arbitration clauses can assure the selection of a law or a decision maker who will enforce terms pro-
vided in the agreement. Default terms matter when parties have a bias in favor of terms supplied by
background law or when they are asymmetrically informed about matters bearing on their agreement.
See Ian Ayers, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2006); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1205-06 (2003). Other-
wise, default and mandatory terms are distinguishable only by the parties' cost in contracting for the
terms they prefer.
135. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 4-103(a), 4A-501(a), 5-103(c) (2005). Institutional rules made applicable
to a letter of credit by contract or usage can be varied. See, e.g., INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC
UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS art. 1 (2006).
136. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1962); U.C.C. § 4-103(a) (2005).
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the customer must report forgeries or unauthorized alterations. A customer
failing to meet this deadline has no claim against its bank. 137 This rule pre-
cludes the customer from recovering from the bank, even if the claim is
asserted within Article 4's three-year statute of limitations. 138 Section 4-
406(f) does not prevent a bank and its customer from reducing the limita-
tion period by contract, and courts generally uphold "cutdown" clauses
drastically shortening 4-406(f)'s one-year outer limit.13 9 Cutdown clauses
that apply without regard to the bank's good faith or ordinary care appar-
ently also are enforceable. 140 Little distinction appears to exist between
consumer and non-consumer customers for these purposes.
The little law on the preclusion rule for wholesale wire transfers con-
siders it a mandatory rule. Under 4A-505, a customer who has paid its re-
ceiving bank that has executed a payment order has no claim for a refund
unless the customer notifies the bank within one year after the bank has
notified the customer of the payment order. Section 4A-501(a) allows the
parties to a funds transfer to vary the terms of their funds transfer agree-
ment, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Article," and 4A-505 does not
explicitly prohibit the parties from altering this one-year limit by agree-
ment. Because a number of provisions in Article 4A are made mandatory
by their terms, 141 a fair inference from 4A-505's silence on the matter is
that its one-year limit can be varied by agreement. But in Regatos v. North
Fork Bank,142 the New York Court of Appeals disagreed. While finding the
question close, the court concluded that 4A-505's one-year limit is a man-
datory rule: allowing customers and their banks to agree to a different limit
would alter Article 4A's "fine-tuned balance" between them. 143 Payments
137. U.C.C. § 4-406(f) (2005).
138. Id. § 4-111.
139. See, e.g., Stowell v. Cloquet Co-op Credit Union, 557 N.W.2d 567, 571-72 (Minn. 1997)
(twenty days); Nat'l Title Ins. Corp. Agency v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 559 S.E.2d 668, 671 (Va. 2002)
(sixty days); Borowski v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, NA, 579 N.W.2d 247, 252-53 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988)
(fourteen days).
140. Cf Pinigis v. Regions Bank, No. 1060474, 2007 WL 1953895, at *10 (Ala. July 6, 2007);
Halifax Corp. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 546 S.E.2d 696, 703 (Va. 2001) (bank's bad faith does not
extend one-year limit); Nat 'l Title Ins. Corp, 559 S.E.2d at 671 (relying on Halifax to enforce cutdown
clause).
141. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 4A-202, 4A-203, 4A-305 (limiting alteration of rules governing security
procedures, limiting alteration of specific rules governing security procedures, and allowing recoverable
consequential damages only when provided for by express written agreement, respectively).
142. 838 N.E.2d 629, 633 (N.Y. 2005).
143. Id. at 633. Unsurprisingly, an informal survey of Article 4A's committee conducted by the Co-
Reporter for Article 4A (William Warren) reveals no agreement on the matter. See WILLIAM D.
WARREN & STEVEN D. WALT, TEACHER'S MANUAL: COMMERCIAL LAW 366-67 (7th ed. 2007). Steffes
v. Heritage Bank NA Willmar, 48 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 287, 290-91 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), interprets
U.C.C. section 4A-505 as a default rule.
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law therefore adopts different preclusion rules for checks and wire trans-
fers.
The law on the alterability of preclusion rules for checks and wire
transfers is mistaken. In fact, as with reversibility rules, it is arguable that
the proper status of the rules is at least partially backwards from current
doctrine. The case for diverse payments rules made above suggests that the
variability of the preclusion rule should be different for firms and for con-
sumers, and that the preclusion rule for consumer checks should be a man-
datory rule, while the preclusion rule for business checks and wire transfers
should be a default rule. Section 4-406(f)'s preclusion rule purports to in-
duce prompt investigation of statements to discover unauthorized signa-
tures and alterations. Once the bank has notified the customer about debits
to its account, the customer has the information needed to detect forged or
unauthorized alterations to checks. 144 At that point the customer is better
positioned than the bank to prevent ongoing forgeries or alterations by the
same wrongdoer. It need only examine statements and notify the bank of
any discrepancies. Once notified, the bank is in a better position than the
drawer to prevent further forgeries or unauthorized alterations, or to re-
cover unauthorized payments.
Section 4-406(f)'s preclusion rule dictates to the bank the period of
time in which it must preserve evidence about notification dates, finance
litigation reserves for defending against claims for unauthorized payment,
and finance loss reserves resulting from unauthorized payments. Cutdown
clauses reduce these costs and therefore should lower the price banks
charge to maintain deposit accounts. But, even if those savings are passed
onto customers, the savings are worthwhile only to the customer who does
not incur a higher expected loss by virtue of being unable to recover from
the drawee for unauthorized debits discovered after the cutdown period. In
short, customers will benefit from a fully-priced cutdown period only if
they are in a position to calculate whether the resulting savings in banking
services costs exceed the value of their greater exposure to undetected
fraud. Consumers, however, may systematically underestimate the conse-
quences of agreeing to a cutdown clause, and thus underprice the clause,
because at the time they agree to it they will have little information con-
ceming its expected value. Nor are banks likely to compete over the time
periods that apply under section 4-406(f) in ways that make different
clauses salient to consumers. As a result, consumers may be led to select
terms they do not prefer. For both reasons, consumers may be better off
144. See Am. Airlines Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Martin, 29 S.W.3d 86, 92 (Tex. 2000).
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with a single preclusion rule like section 4-406(f). This arguably justifies
making section 4-406(f) a mandatory rule for consumer users of checks.
One might contend that differential preclusion periods are unneces-
sary, because non-consumer customers who have better information about
fraud risks can serve as effective proxies for consumers, since section 4-
406(f) and the cutdown clauses will nominally apply to both. It is not clear,
however, that the interests of consumers and non-consumers are suffi-
ciently aligned to confirm the proxy argument. Non-consumers may be
more susceptible to fraud, since a great deal of check fraud involves mis-
feasance by employees. In addition, non-consumers are likely to be dealing
with checks written in greater amounts than consumers. The combination
of higher rates of check fraud and higher losses per case means that non-
consumers face a higher expected loss from check fraud than consumers.
As a result, non-consumers have incentives to discover fraud quickly. Non-
consumers are therefore more likely to agree to a cutdown clause, since
they will have less need for the full statutory period in any event. If that is
the case, then non-consumers would not be suitable proxies for consumers,
who might have less incentive to examine statements promptly. In short,
while non-consumers may have better information than consumers about
whether pricing of banking services with a cutdown clause makes a reduc-
tion of the statutory period worthwhile, non-consumer calculations of the
tradeoff do not necessarily reflect the same risk/benefit calculus that con-
sumers face. Thus, non-consumer calculations cannot compensate for the
informational deficiencies that consumers suffer. While access to informa-
tion may justify contractual variations from the statutory period in the case
of non-consumers, that is less likely to be the case for consumers. Nor can
we rely on market competition to fill the informational void for consumers.
Given the low probability of check fraud for consumers, neither the statu-
tory default rule nor the contractual cutdown period is likely to be salient to
consumers at the time they open accounts. A consumer is likely to become
aware of the notification requirement only after fraud in his or her account
materializes. Banks, therefore, are unlikely to compete for customers by
avoiding cutdown periods or offering pricing tradeoffs for them.
If we are correct about the distinctions between consumers and non-
consumers, then there might be reason to bar cutdown clauses in the case of
consumers. The proposal to bar such clauses in the case of consumers is
limited by the strong behavioral assumptions needed to support it. Con-
sumer users of checks may not be subject to the cognitive failures identi-
fied in sufficient numbers to warrant barring cutdown clauses. Even if
prevalent, the trouble might be remedied by detailed disclosure or statuto-
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rily mandated forms of "cognitive therapy" without refusing to enforce
them. The behavioral research on the effects of over-optimism and com-
plexity on choice may not be robust enough to easily apply to consumer
users of checks. 145 Thus, under limited conditions, a statutory preclusion
rule justifiably may be made mandatory. 146
But even if there is a limited case for imposing mandatory preclusion
rules for consumers, there is much less reason to deprive parties to whole-
sale wire transfers from treating the state-supplied preclusion as only a
default. A customer and its bank making the funds transfer may have dif-
ferent risk-bearing capacities than most customers and banks. In such cases
the bank will offer to execute a wire transfer at a lower price if section 4A-
505's one-year limit is reduced than if the wire transfer remains subject to
it. The customer will prefer the lower priced contract if the increased risk
placed on it under the contract is less than the reduction in price. Absent in
wholesale wire transfers are informational asymmetries, effects on third
parties, or paternalist concerns that warrant a mandatory rule. Wholesale
wire transfers occur between non-consumer originators and banks, and
often between repeat players, so that neither party systematically lacks
relevant information more than in any other sort of contract between com-
mercial parties. Unlike the consumer customer, the non-consumer origina-
tor of a wire transfer easily can learn about the reputation and abilities of its
receiving bank. It does not benefit from signals that mandatory terms might
provide about the bank's trustworthiness or competence. Because the costs
of negotiating, performing, and enforcing wholesale wire transfers pre-
sumably are impounded in the price of wire transfer, non-pecuniary exter-
nalities aren't present. Paternalism also is not a concern because the parties
are non-consumers. The originator therefore does not require protection.
Even if non-consumer originators required protection, no normatively-
compelling principle describes the way in which they ought to be protected.
145. Compare Colin F. Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry, in CHOICES,
VALUES, AND FRAMES 414-23 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (overconfidence
among experimental subjects resulting from extrapolation of current trends), with David A. Armor &
Shelly E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334-47 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel
Kahneman. eds., 2002) (questioning extent of optimism in predictions), Sheena S. lyengar & Mark R.
Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERS. &
SOC. PSYCH. 995, 1003 (2000) (people respond to increasing number of options by relying on simple
rules to make choices), and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996) (summarizing literature finding that structure of choice produces suboptimal
decisions).
146. We recognize that some states have modified the official version of section 4-406(f) to provide
a statutory cutdown period. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 11-4-406(f) (West 2002) (sixty-day period for
reporting unauthorized signature or alteration).
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Article 4A's drafting involved extensive negotiations, principally be-
tween representatives of banks and corporate and commercial users of
funds transfers. 147 The bargaining produced a set of rules that presump-
tively reflect the preferences of the majority of banks and corporate and
commercial users. For a minority of banks, the costs of maintaining large
reserves to refund payments and the potential loss from being unable to
recover mistaken or unauthorized payment orders downstream during sec-
tion 4A-505's one-year limit may be too high. Correspondingly, their
originators might be able to take cost-justified precautions in reporting
mistaken or unauthorized debit from their accounts sooner than a year after
receiving the bank's notice of the debit. The average value of a wire trans-
fer is large, with a wide variance, 148 making an originator's early reporting
presumptively cost-justified for some funds transfers. These originators
therefore might accept a reduced price for the funds transfer in exchange
for a shortened period in which they must report an unauthorized payment.
The funds transfer laws of other countries, which allow parties to set a re-
porting period by contract, enforces such agreements. 149 Section 4A-505 is
not by its terms a mandatory rule, and allowing parties to vary its one-year
limit effectuates the atypical preferences of a minority of originators and
banks. The case for diversity in payments law recommends that Article
4A's preclusion rule be a default rule, like section 4-406(f)'s preclusion
rule for checks. The Regatos court is mistaken that Article 4A's preclusion
rule "fine tunes" the balance between the originator and its bank; the par-
ties' contract instead does this.
CONCLUSION
Current law assigns different payment risks differently across some
payment systems. Whether this diversity in legal rules is justified depends
on whether different payment system rules should be uniform. At a very
general level, the standard for selecting rules is the same: the rules that
most parties would prefer to govern the payment aspect of their transac-
tions should apply. Most parties usually prefer to minimize the costs asso-
147. Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., The UCC Process-Consensus and Balance, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 287,
294-95 (1994).
148. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., FEDWIRE FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEM:
ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE CORE PRINCIPLES FOR SYSTEMATICALLY IMPORTANT
PAYMENT SYSTEMS 9 (2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/coreprinciples/default.
htm (reporting that the median amount of 2005 Fedwire funds transfers was about S32,000, the average
amount was 3.9 million dollars, and about 10% of funds transfers were for more than one million
dollars).
149. See, e.g., GEVA, supra note 1, at 418 (Swiss law).
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ciated with a payment term for their transaction. This "meta-principle"
therefore usually selects rules which assign the relevant risk of loss associ-
ated with a payment term to the party in the superior position to avoid it.
However, different parties can be in a superior position to avoid a loss,
depending on the type of loss and incentive effects of assigning a risk of
loss. Further, where parties are risk-averse or unreliable at evaluating risk,
most parties might prefer to shift risk away from these parties, even if they
are in a superior position to avoid it. For both reasons, the "meta-principle"
need not select the same rules for unauthorized payment, finality, or re-
versibility of payment, for example, across payment systems. The uniform
principle justifies diverse rules for payment systems. The extent of diver-
sity among them turns on a detailed assessment of the comparative risk-
reducing abilities of parties, as well as attitudes toward risk of users of
different payment systems.
This conclusion is not surprising. It resembles the consensus reached
in the law and economics literature on the choice of optimal remedy for
breach of contract. The literature shows that there is no single optimal rem-
edy when all relevant variables are taken into account. Available remedies
result from a variety of variables, ranging from the choice of contracting
partner, investment in the contract, the extent of negotiations of contract
terms, the care with which the contract is performed, and negotiations in
the event of breach. 150 For instance, remedies that encourage efficient
breach also can encourage overinvestment in the contract, while remedies
that discourage overinvestment can encourage inefficient breach. No single
remedy optimally reduces the costs of negotiating, performing, and enforc-
ing a contract. The optimal remedy instead is likely to be some hybrid form
of relief.
This Article argues that a similar result holds for rules governing
payment systems. Factors bearing on precautions and attitudes toward risk
make it unlikely that optimal rules will allocate loss between payment pro-
viders and users the same way across payment systems. Informational
asymmetries may put one party in a superior position to avoid an element
of loss at one time, while another party may be better positioned to avoid it
at a later time. Further, a party may be in a better position to pursue risk-
reducing technologies at a later time while at present that same party is in
an inferior position to avoid loss. The payment system provider or user may
be better positioned depending on the type of loss and the payments sys-
150. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. Cm. L. REv. 99, 107-11 (2000);
Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112
YALE L. J. 829, 834-39 (2003).
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tern. A credit card issuer might be better positioned to detect all unauthor-
ized use of a credit card than its consumer cardholder (statutory assump-
tions aside), while a drawee bank processing checks under a positive pay
program is in an inferior position to its drawer to detect forged checks. This
makes it unlikely that the optimal rule for unauthorized use will be the
same for credit cards and checks. Again, the card issuer may know more
than the cardholder about the likelihood of defective performance by a
merchant in the underlying transaction; the card issuer may also have
greater leverage over the merchant than the consumer cardholder. The
drawee bank or bank executing a wire transfer may not have similar advan-
tages in their knowledge of the underlying transaction. Optimal reversibil-
ity rules probably will differ between checks and wire transfers. In
addition, many users of particular payment systems may be risk-averse or
unable to reliably assess relevant risk, so that they prefer to allocate risk of
loss without regard to their ability to take precautions. For these reasons,
optimal rules for allocating relevant loss will be diverse across payment
systems.

